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INTRODUCTION
Shaming is in. Many of the same legal scholars who have recently
tuirned their attention to social norms and questions of social meaning
have taken a similar interest in shaming sanctions. The connections
are obvious. Shaming sanctions range from requiring drunk drivers
to wear T-shirts announcing their crimes to forcing polluters to place
advertisements confessing and apologizing for their offenses. One of
the common threads that tie these disparate punishments together is
that each is designed to elicit moral disapproval from the offenders'
fellow citizens. Far more than with penalties such as fines or
imprisonment, this moral disapproval is the beginning and end of the
punishment. Shaming thus draws on shared social meaning and on
norms about permissible and impermissible behavior. Given these
links, it is hardly surprising that norms scholars would take a fervent
interest in shaming.
From another perspective, however, the recent interest in
shaming is somewhat odd. Shaming sanctions work best in close-knit
communities in which citizens interact frequently and share common
values. Because reputation is so important in this context, citizens will
avoid behavior that may lead to shaming and will view shaming as a
serious punishment. While American society may once have been
characterized by close-knit communities, this seems far less true now.
Moreover, a casual glance at the television or a visit to the movies
suggests that behavior we once might have viewed as shameful has lost
its opprobrium. If we no longer live in communities with shared
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values and do not recognize shame, what explains the sudden interest
in shaming? One explanation is simply that academics are out of
touch with real-world conditions, of course, but I will put that
possibility to one side. A more likely rationale may be nostalgia.
Although the close-knit communities of earlier generations have
disappeared, the fascination with shaming, and with norms generally,
may reflect a dream that this lost sense of community could be
restored. A more optimistic explanation is that community still
figures prominently in our national life, but the nature of the relevant
communities has changed. This view, that community is alive and well
but has simply taken different shapes, has been the most frequent
rebuttal to the much-discussed new book Bowling Alone.' Bowling Alone
documents the decline of community interaction-people bowl alone
now, rather than with friends in bowling leagues. Its critics, on the
other hand, argue that old-style community organizations like bowling
leagues or the Rotary Club have simply given way to more
contemporary organizations, such as professional associations.!
While I do not purport to offer any final view on these issues in
this Article, my analysis will assume throughout, and at least
anecdotally demonstrate, that corporations and corporate directors
are enmeshed in communities in which reputation does indeed
matter. The directors of large U.S. corporations are, in the words of
one shareholder activist, "the most reputationally sensitive people in
the world."3 Not only are shaming sanctions a potentially effective
penalty for corporations and their directors, they already play a
prominent and, in many respects, underappreciated role.
This Article is not the first to explore shaming in the corporate
context. Other commentators have discussed, either implicitly or
explicitly, the possibility of shaming corporate offenders.4 Despite this
evidence of existing interest, there is much work to be done, and my
aim is to extend the literature in at least two respects. First, the Article
provides the most detailed examination to date of what we might call
the "anatomy" of corporate shaming. I explore the role and
limitations of the enforcer-that is, the person who invokes the
I ROBERT D. PUTNAM. BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERicAN COMMUNITY (2000).
2 Margaret Talbot, Who Wants To Be a Legionnaire?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2000, § 7,
at 11 (reviewing PUTrNAM, supra note 1).
3 Interview with Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate Library, in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 25, 2000) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Minow Interview].
See infra note 48 (citing commentary on corporate shaming).
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shaming sanction-the offender, and the enforcement community
(or communities).' The area in which corporate shaming differs most
from shaming in other contexts is in the nature of the offender. With
a corporation, the corporation itself, its individual managers or
directors, or both, can be viewed as the relevant offender. The Article
therefore considers at length the question of who or what should be
the target of a shaming sanction. I also examine the relationship
between shaming and forms of criticism or disclosure, such as media
coverage of a firm's misbehavior, that can have an analogous effect.
Second, and perhaps more important, the Article significantly
expands the focus of the shaming inquiry. The existing literature,
both in the corporate context and elsewhere, has focused almost
entirely on the use of shaming sanctions as a penalty for violating
criminal or certain kinds of civil laws, such as noncriminal
environmental provisions. From this perspective, the enforcer is
always a court. Yet private parties also shame wayward directors and
firms. In the corporate law context, shareholder activists and the
financial press have made frequent use of shaming techniques. Each
time CalPERS, the California state employees' pension fund, publishes
a list of underperforming firms, for instance, one of its central goals is
to shame the offending firms. To understand corporate shaming
more fully, the Article therefore considers the activities of private
enforcers rather than justjudicial ones.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the
current literature on shaming, focusing in particular on the debate
between shaming advocates who argue that shaming sanctions are a
promising alternative to traditional punishments and shaming
skeptics who worry about unintended effects ofjudicial shaming. The
Part concludes by briefly considering the mechanism by which
shaming works and the relationship between shaming sanctions and
social norms. Part II shifts from shaming in general to corporate
shaming in particular and considers each of the relevant parties to a
shaming sanction: the enforcer, the audience or enforcement
community, and the offender.
I have borrowed my terminology from Robert Ellickson's helpful overview of the
norms literature. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A
Perspective from the Legal Academy (Program for Studies in Law, Econ., and Pub.
Policy, Yale Law Sch., Working Paper No. 230,July 1, 1999) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author), available at http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractid=191392.
" See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming I Wite-Collar Criminals: A
ProposalforReform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42J.L. & ECON. 365,385 (1999).
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In Part III, the Article shifts from theory to reality and considers
three different specific case studies of shaming in action: the use by
CalPERS and the financial press of "rosters of shame"; shareholder
activists Robert Monks's and Nell Minow's more aggressive shaming
campaigns, which included a full-page Wall Street Journal advertisement
shaming the directors of Sears by name; and the decision of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in a case stemming from alleged
Medicaid and Medicare violations by Caremark Industries.
Part IV concludes the Article by considering some of the
implications of the analysis, both for the norms literature in general
and for the future of corporate shaming. For private enforcers like
CalPERS and other shareholder activists, I suggest that the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") could facilitate shaming by
forcing offending firms to bear some of the costs of shaming efforts. I
also briefly consider the potential effect of low-cost, high-tech,
shaming-like activity on the internet. Forjudicial shaming, I consider
how shaming could be fit into the kinds of multifaceted liability
schemes that have been proposed in the literature on corporate
criminal and tort liability.
I. THE CURRENT DEBATE ABOUT SHAMING
Shaming sanctions take forms that are as endlessly varied as the
human imagination. In the past, we had pillories and branding; now,
we have offenders wearing T-shirts that say "drunk driver."7 To make
sense of all this shame, it is useful to begin by defining "shaming" in
general terms. "Shaming," as defined by its leading advocate in the
legal literature, "is the process by which citizens publicly and self-
consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an
offender, as a way of punishing him for having those dispositions or
engaging in those actions."8 Whereas imprisonment punishes the
offender by taking away her physical freedom, shaming takes aim at
the offender's reputation or dignity. The enforcer expresses moral
outrage at the offender, expecting that the intended audience will
respond with similar moral disapproval. Not only does this moral
disapproval have a chastening effect on actual offenders, since the
7 For a discussion of historical sanctions and their decline and a defense of the
contemporary use of shaming penalties, see Dan M. Kahan, Wat Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996). For an earlier, much more skeptical
analysis of shaming, see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law. 89
Mirc. L. REv. 1880 (1991).
8 Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at 368.
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effect on their reputation can be devastating and costly, but the
possibility of shaming can also discourage potential offenders from
misbehaving in the first instance.
The most famous literary depiction of shaming, Nathaniel
Hawthorne's The Scarlet Lette, illustrates the conditions under which
shaming sanctions prove most effective. 9 In the New England Puritan
community Hawthorne imagined, the town's citizens were closely knit
and shared a common set of moral assumptions. The judge who
ordered Hester Prynne, the offender, to wear a scarlet letter "A" could
be confident that the relevant audience, the town's citizens, would
share his moral outrage at her adultery, and of course they did.
Although the sense of community we associate with the Puritans
has long since disappeared in the United States, citizens hold
common views about many issues, such as outrage at drunk driving,
and nearly all of us participate in one or more communities that share
many of the same qualities that once characterized citizens' general,
civic lives. In our families or our professions, for instance,
relationships often are closely intertwined and our reputations matter
a great deal. In these contexts, shaming can be a powerful corrective
when individuals violate the shared values of the community.
Given our fascination with norms, and the interaction between
norms and law, it was perhaps inevitable that legal scholars would
rediscover the possibilities of shaming sanctions. And they have.
Scholars have sharply divided as to whether shaming is a promising
new approach to punishing offenders or, as my reference to The Scarlet
Letter might suggest, a dangerous and often pernicious practice. The
discussion that follows provides a brief overview of the current debate.
I then consider the connections between shaming and norms and
briefly address how shaming works.
A. The Shaming Literature
The most prominent advocate of shaming in the legal literature
has been Professor Dan Kahan. Kahan defends shaming as part of a
more general theory about the expressive dimension of criminal law.
In his view, the social meaning of a criminal punishment-what it
expresses-is crucial to its effectiveness.' In addition to, or as part of,
deterrence or retribution, Kahan argues, well-devised criminal
" NATHvNIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Harry Levin ed., Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1960) (1850).
Jo Kahan, supra note 7, at 597.
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penalties must also give voice to society's disapproval of the behavior
in question." Fines are a good illustration of a sanction that has
proven problematic for expressive reasons. At least in theory, fines
could have a significant deterrent effect on white-collar crime; yet they
are deeply controversial, in Kahan's view, because "fines are
insufficiently expressive of condemnation.' 2  Kahan explains that
"when fines are used as a substitute for imprisonment, the message is
likely to be that the offenders' conduct is being priced rather than
sanctioned.",3  Imprisonment sends a very different message and is
therefore more acceptable in expressive terms.
From this perspective, an obvious benefit of shaming sanctions is
that they clearly signal a community's moral disapproval of the
offender's conduct. 4  Because shaming sanctions undermine the
offender's reputation, they often serve the traditional functions of
criminal law. Would-be offenders will be deterred by the threat of
being shamed for their offenses, and the retributive goals of the
criminal law are satisfied by the reputational penalties suffered by
actual offenders as a result of their shaming. In short, shaming can
both deter and punish, and it does so in a way that expresses clear
social condemnation of the offender's actions.5
Added to the expressive virtues of shaming is its low cost. Unlike
imprisonment, which requires an elaborate administrative apparatus,
shaming relies largely on private enforcement. Once a judge
administers a shaming sanction, the sanction is, in effect, carried out
by the offender's community. Community members gossip among
themselves and withhold approval, all of which takes place outside of
the formal criminal justice system and does not require the
expenditure of public funds. 6
" Id. at 601.
12 Id. at 620.
13 Id. at 621.
14 In the literature on expressive uses of law, commentators have debated whether
a sanction can have independent, expressive value entirely apart from any impact or
consequences that the sanction has. For a survey and rejection of this possibility, see
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363 (2000). The sanctions we will see in this Article lead to obvious, often tangible
reactions in and responses by the relevant community. I do not take a position on
whether they also have an independent, expressive value.
15 See Kahan, supra note 7, at 63049 (discussing the punishment and deterrent
values of shaming penalties).
16 See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at 372 (suggesting that shaming may
often be "cheaper for the government than imprisonment"). Kahan and Posner note,
however, that the private costs "incurred by people who shun the offender" may make
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A final benefit of shaming is that its expressive qualities and
relatively low cost can be combined with more traditional
punishments to expand lawmakers' enforcement options. Once
again, the best illustration is criminal fines. Although fines alone
seem inadequate as a punishment for white-collar crime, lawmakers
could achieve much more effective results by coupling fines with a
shaming sanction. Requiring white-collar criminals to pay a steep fine
and also make a formal apology for their crime could harness the
deterrent potential of fines and, at the same time, express unequivocal
social disapproval.1
7
Like the shaming theorists themselves, I have focused my
attention on criminal liability. But shaming offers very similar benefits
in the civil law context and, as we will see, for private enforcers as well.
If an offender has violated the standards of a relevant community, but
the act does not implicate any criminal law, enforcers often have
precisely the same shaming techniques at their disposal. A court that
forces a polluter to issue a public apology, for instance, is engaging in
shaming even if the environmental law is civil rather than criminal in
nature.
For enthusiasts, then, shaming offers a low-cost way to promote
shared values in all kinds of contexts. Skeptics, by contrast, see a
darker, more corrosive side of shaming. Many skeptics, and even
some enthusiasts, worry most about the effect of shaming on
offenders-those who are forced to endure the shame. 8 Perhaps the
most vivid danger is the risk that shaming sanctions will prove too
effective. If the relevant community shuns an offender enough, the
offender may form a "deviant subcommunity" that flaunts the morals
of the relevant community. The Scarlet Letter once again bears elegant
witness to this problem. Forced to wear the scarlet "A," Hester Prynne
embroiders it lavishly, as if to embrace her very ignominy.19 She and
her daughter, Pearl, establish their own, defiant minicommunity on
the margins of the town that had shamed them." The same problem
arises in our own era when inner-city youths who are convicted of
crimes treat their criminal record as a badge of honor and seek the
the overall cost high, evenif the costs to the government are low. Id. at 372-73.
So,', e.g., A at 385-87 (advocating a "special hybrid penalty" consisting of a fixed
shaming component and a variable fine component).
Se, e.g., Massaro, supra note 7, at 1920-21 (noting the negative psychological
effects of shaming on the offender).
H WTHORWNE, supra note 9, at 81.
Id. at 78-87.
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approval of gangs rather than return to law-abiding society.2
The risk of inspiring or reinforcing deviant subcommunities is, in
a sense, a specific instance of a more general problem: the difficulty
of achieving the optimal amount of deterrence or retribution.
Shaming sanctions can have dramatically different consequences for
different offenders. An offender whose skills are extremely valuable,
for instance, may be largely immune from the effects of shaming.22 A
stockbroker who has the Midas touch may face few long-term
consequences if she is shamed for insider trading, whereas a more
humble trader may find her life in shambles.' 3 Skeptics of shaming
find this variability in the effect of shaming sanctions deeply
problematic and at odds with the assumption that offenders who
commit the same offense should receive the same penalties.2'
Skeptics also question whether the costs of shaming are as low as
enthusiasts insist.25 The most interesting variation of this criticism
focuses on the social value of reputation. Unlike levying a fine, which
involves a transfer of the benefit from the offender to the victim or
the state, an effective shaming sanction destroys the offender's
reputation without providing an offsetting benefit to someone else.""
Reputations are costly to establish and maintain and thus have
significant social value. This social value goes up in smoke when an
2 Australian criminologist John Braithwaite discusses the risk that shaming will
create or reinforce deviant subcultures in detail in his book, JOHN BRAITHWAJTE,
CRI ME, SHA,ME AND REINTEGRATION (1989). The solution, Braithwaite believes, is
"reintegrative shaming," shaming that punishes offenders but then welcomes them
back into the relevant community. Id. at 54-68.
22 This notion does not mean that there are no effects for the offender. If she has
internalized the norm that she violated, the offender may be affected by a shaming
sanction, but the external consequences will be much weaker than for other offenders.
23 Kahan and Posner use the gifted stockbroker illustration. Kahan & Posner,
supra note 6, at 372. The defendant in a well-known insider trading case, Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), is a particularly vivid example of the consequences
of a ruined reputation to a less exalted offender. Although Chiarella was acquitted of
insider trading charges, the stigma of the case proved devastating. "[A]fter twenty
years as a printer," wrote the Wall Street Journa4 "he was forced to drift from job to
job... always living near the poverty line .... [E]very mention of his past in the press
presaged the end of each job." Bryan Burrough, After the Fal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18,
1987, at 1.
24 See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 7, at 1896-99, 1918.
25 See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at 372-73 (noting this objection).
26 See generally V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1503 (1996) (arguing that reputational penalties have social
costs). Massaro makes a somewhat similar point, arguing that the United States no
longer has the kind of community structure that might help to reintegrate offenders
into society after they have been shamed. Massaro, supra note 7, at 1922-28.
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offender is shamed. Another cost of shaming is the time and expense
incurred by the relevant audience-the community members who
cany, out the sanction by refusing to transact with, or otherwise
expressing disapproval of, the offender. Although the cost to each
individual community member may be small, the collective cost could,
at least in theory, prove quite large.27
In a fascinating account of the closely analogous issue of
informational privacy, Seth Kreimer suggests several additional
concerns.s Kreimer notes that shaming sanctions are sometimes too
easy to apply, which could lead to their indiscriminate use, especially
by private enforcers. 2' A similar concern is lack of process: offenders
may have little opportunity to defend themselves."°
James Whitman raises yet another objection. Whitman insists that
harnessing community enforcement-which shaming enthusiasts tout
as a benefit of shaming-really may not be such a good thing. "Once
the state stirs up public opprobrium against an offender," Whitman
argues, "it cannot really control the way the public treats that
offender."' In some cases, such as the publication of the names of
sexual offenders under Megan's Law statutes, shaming raises a
genuine risk of rioting. Even in less volatile circumstances, Whitman
wories, shaming gives too much "enforcement power to a fickle and
uncontrolled general populace." 2
What are we to make of these starkly opposed perspectives on the
desirability of shaming sanctions? When we turn to corporate
shaming in the next Part, I will argue that we need to focus more
carefully on the particular context-that is, who the target, enforcer,
' S'e Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at 372 (noting a possible large cost in the
areas of time and deterrence).
Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy
and Distlosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-12, 117-26, 137-38 (1991).
Rudolph Guiliani's practice as U.S. Attorney in New York of staging very public arrests
of stockbrokers who were accused of engaging in fraudulent market activities was an
interesting illustration of the concerns described in the text that follows. See, e.g.,
Anthony Bianco & Gary Weiss, Suddenly the Fish Get Bigger, BUS. WK., Mar. 2, 1987, at 28;
Kevin G. Salwen, U.S. Ends Inquiry of 117gton and Tabor, 2 Years After Dropping Charges,
WALL ST.J., Aug. 18, 1989, available at 1989 WL-WSJ 469039.
Sr Kreimer, supra note 28, at 12 ("Although the precise effects of disclosure will
xary with context, our liberties are at risk when our constitutional law ignores the
poi1cr of information to punish.").
.St, e.g., id. at 6 (describing the "government's ability to sanction disfavored
actixities by the simple act of public disclosure").
q James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J.
10155, 1088 (1998).
, /d.
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and relevant audience are-before we can make any firm judgments. -
We can, however, make at least one very general point: the objections
to shaming do not make out a compelling case for rejecting this
approach altogether. Both the risk of deviant subcommunities and
the dangers of a "fickle populace" seem more serious in some contexts
than in others. Offenders who are shamed for drug offenses or
property crime, for instance, are more likely to form outcast
communities than drunk drivers or polluters. The cost objections are
plausible, but debatable. Although the aggregate costs to a
community of enforcing a shaming sanction may be large, it certainly
is not intuitively obvious that they swamp the costs of imprisonment
and other alternatives. Similarly, traditional enforcement techniques
raise many of the same calibration difficulties as shaming; in each
case, the effect of the penalty may vary from individual to individual.
To assess the promise of shaming we must take a closer look at the
kind of shaming we have in mind. In the next Part, we will do just
that when we turn to the corporation. First, however, a brief note on
the relationship between shaming and norms.
B. A Note on the Relationship Between Shaming and Norms
Shaming sanctions are so integrally connected to social norms
that it is not entirely clear where one leaves off and the other begins.
A norm cannot survive unless it is enforced and, loosely speaking,
norms are enforced in one or more of three different ways: guilt,
shunning, and shaming. If the would-be offender feels guilt, she may
enforce the norm unilaterally even in the absence of intervention by
others. If community members see her violate the norm or learn
about a violation, an enforcer may shame her by drawing attention to
the violation. Other community members may then respond by
shunning the offender. When we talk about norm enforcement, we
therefore are often talking about shaming.
The shaming sanctions we will be considering in this Article are,
in a sense, a subset of shaming activity generally. By shaming
sanction, I mean, as noted earlier, a public statement made or
ordered by an enforcer, directed at the offender, and addressed to the
relevant community as a whole.34 When Robert Monks and Nell
See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
For a similar definition, see Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at 368-69
("[Sihaming is a matter of revealing information about a person's dispositions or
actions.... [T]he revelation ... must be done in a way that is knowa to the target of
SHAMING IN CORPORATE LAW
Minow publish a full-page advertisement calling the directors of Sears
its "Non-Performing Assets,"3' or when ajudge orders a firm to publish
a letter apologizing for polluting,36 these are shaming sanctions. My
definition does not include a purely private confrontation, as when a
neighbor confronts an offender who is walking her dog on a trail
where dogs are not permitted, at a time when no one else is around.37
Public criticism alone-absent any moral condemnation or
"blaming"-also does not constitute shaming, although it can have a
similar effect.
Although I have narrowed my focus to a particular kind of
shaming, the fact remains that shaming sanctions, like shaming
generally, are a device for enforcing norms. Much of the legal
literature on norms therefore applies to shaming sanctions. Perhaps
the most widely debated issue in norms literature is the most basic
question of all: just how do norms work-what is the "mechanism"
that drives, sustains, or changes a social norm? Thus far, legal scholars
have developed two somewhat similar explanationsY Richard
McAdams emphasizes esteem and the effect that community
members' withholding or conferring esteem can have on a would-be
offender. " Eric Posner characterizes norms as a signaling game in
the shaming....").
3" See infra Part III.B (giving a detailed discussion of the Sears battle).
31 See infra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing remedies for the behavior
of corporate polluters and other lawbreakers).
This is a variation of the "case of the devoted dog lovers" illustration Bob Scott
uses in his analysis of the existing norms literature. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1608 (2000).
3 As we will see infra in Part III, these distinctions become quite subtle in the
prii-ate enforcement context. For instance, a Wall StreetJournal story might disclose the
inappropriate behavior of a firm's managers without explicitly shaming them. In my
definition, shaming requires an intent by the enforcer to morally condemn the
offender.
3 The puzzle for legal scholars is why community members are willing to enforce
a norm gihen that enforcement is a public good. The two theories described below
speculate that enforcement may actually be costless (McAdams) or that community
members may anticipate benefits that offset the costs (Posner). For an excellent
overiew of the existing literature, written by the pioneer of legal scholarship on
norms, see Ellickson, supra note 5. See also Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order
Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 390 (1994).
See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L.
REv. 1649, 1691 (2000) (discussing the theory of "labeling" and asserting that
"[elvolutionary game theory shows that law can influence behavior by its labeling
poiser"); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulations of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997) (proposing a model based on the theory that the initial force
behind norm creation is the desire individuals have for the relative esteem of others).
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which community members try to signal that they are cooperative
"good types" rather than "bad types," the latter of which community
members punish by refusing to transact with them.4'
A closely related issue is what makes norms change. Here, too,
the legal scholarship is very much in its infancy. Norms scholars have
focused on the role that "norm entrepreneurs," such as black
churches in the civil rights movement, play in altering norms." Norm
entrepreneurs are most likely to be effective if the costs or benefits of
an existing norm, or the membership of the relevant community, have
changed-that is, when exogenous factors have undermined an
existing norm.4' Endogenous factors, such as changes in a community
member's preferences, also seem to play a role, but we do not yet have
a plausible theory of how this works."
We will see many of these factors in action as we explore the role
of shaming sanctions in corporate law. Norm entrepreneurs such as
Monks and Minow have figured prominently as U.S. corporate
governance norms have shifted from minimal expectations for
directorial oversight to an expectation that directors will take a more
active role.5 (As often is the case in analyzing norms, it is impossible
41 See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOcIAL NOP\iS (2000) (examining the
relationship between norms and the law); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social
Norms in Politics and the Law, 27J. LEGAL STuD. 765 (1998) (introducing the signaling
model to explain the role of symbols in people's behavior and beliefs, with special
attention to the legal manipulation of signals).
42 Cass Sunstein seems to have imported the term into the legal literature. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996).
43 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 5, at 29-32 (discussing events that can trigger a
chanhe in norms).
Robert Cooter has developed the most elaborate theory of endogenous
preferences and their role in creating or altering norms. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter,
Expressive Law and Economics, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 597-98 (1998). For a critique, see
Scott, supra note 37, at 1632-37 (questioning why someone who is not already a
"cooperator" would engage in "Pareto self-improvement" to become a "cooperator").
In an interesting new article, Dan Kahan focuses on the relationship between social
influence, or citizens' propensity to conform to the views of those around them, and
changes in norms. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the StickI
Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 608 (2000) (suggesting that lawmakers are more
successful in changing norms when they use incremental adjustments rather than
"hard shoves").
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253
(1999) (providing a valuable analysis of corporate norms, with particular emphasis on
the change in directorial behavior in the past two decades). A variety of related norms
will figure in our discussion of corporate shaming. For instance, directors are
expected to provide meaningful oversight, eliminate obvious obstacles to their
accountability to shareholders, and assure that the firm honors the environmental and
antitrust laws.
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to determine just how much credit the participants deserve for the
shift to more active directorial oversight; at the least, shareholder
activists have served as norm arbitrageurs, highlighting directors who
have not yet adjusted their governance standards to the current, more
hands-on approach.) Corporate law also offers unusually clear
evidence of the effect of shaming sanctions. In addition to losing
esteem, directors and firms that violate a norm are punished in very
tangible ways-investors refuse to buy their stock, for instance, and
consumers may avoid their products.
II. A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE SHAMING
Corporations already have made their mark on the shaming
literature. The standard list of illustrations of shaming includes drunk
drivers forced to wear T-shirts proclaiming their crime, a slumlord
who was required to spend time in his repulsive apartments, and a
cluster of cases that have instructed corporate polluters to issue public
apologies for their misbehavior." Interestingly, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines explicitly authorize shaming penalties of this
sort, and shaming enthusiasts have treated these provisions as a model
that should be used in other contexts.
47
This is not to say, however, that shaming theorists have
meaningfully integrated corporate offenders into their analysis.
Reading the existing literature often gives one the impression that
corporate offenders can be lumped indiscriminately with individual
offenders-that is, that no meaningful differences divide the two.4'
But this obviously is not the case. Shifting from individual to
corporate offenders introduces an entirely new dimension. Because
corporations are run by agents-the managers-there are two
;" Kahan, supra note 7, at 632-34; see also Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at 385-87
(describing corporate apologies for illegal dumping of hazardous waste and arguing
for similar shaming of white-collar criminals).
,S'. eag., U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINES MANuAL § 8D1.4 (1998).
One article that does distinguish between the corporation and its individual
managers isJayne w. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L.
REv. 959 (1999). Barnard argues that section 8C2.5 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which permits a court to require that a firm's chief executive appear at its
sentencing under some circumstances, should be expanded. See id. at 985-97
(suggesting that CEOs should participate more extensively in "woodshed"
proceedings). Outside of the legal literature, criminologist John Braithwaite has
written two books that address issues of corporate shaming in elegant detail:
BRAITHWUATE, supra note 21; BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF
PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983).
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possible offenders rather than one. Shaming the corporation may
have very different effects than shaming the managers or other
employees individually. Only by considering both the corporate entity
and its individual agents can we understand corporate shaming.
The discussion that follows will sketch out a simple anatomy of
corporate shaming. The best way to do this is to analyze each of the
three parties who take part in a shaming sanction. I will start by
considering the enforcer, who is often a court, but who may also be a
shareholder activist or other interested party. Next, I will examine the
relevant enforcement community, or "audience." Finally, I will look at
the target or offender.49 I save the offender for last because the
decision whether to shame the corporate entity or particular
individuals raises the most difficult and intriguing issues we will
encounter.
Throughout this Part, we will remain in the realm of theory. With
each of the participants in the shaming process, I will speculate about
the conditions under which shaming might or might not make sense.
The Part that follows will explore these predictions in a much more
textured way by considering actual shaming cases.
A. The Enforcer: Courts and Shareholder Activists
In the instances of corporate shaming that come most quickly to
mind-the corporate polluter or corporate price fixer-courts play
the role of enforcer. Shaming, however, need not be limited to the
litigation process. When a prominent shareholder such as CalPERS
publishes a list of underperforming corporations, for instance, the
principal purpose of the list is to shame the offending firms.5"
At first glance, CalPERS's focus list and the other examples of
nonjudicial shaming may seem to lack one crucial thing: the moral
component. When a corporate polluter is shamed by a court, we can
easily see how the firm has offended a community standard. "' Can we
make the same claim about the firms that are held up for
49 I have borrowed my terms from the typology Ellickson uses in assessing norms
generally. See Ellickson, supra note 5.
CalPERS's "focus list" of underperforming firms is discussed in detail infra in
Part 1ILA.
1 By referring to the moral component and to community standards, I do not
mean to suggest that the morality of the community is necessarily admirable. As
discussed below, community norms can be quite pernicious. See infra Part II.B. My
point is simply that true shaming is based on community standards of right and wrong
and thus has a moral dimension.
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condemnation by shareholder activists or the business press? The
answer is yes. Although in times past the directors of large firms were
not expected to do much at all, an increasingly powerful norm
condemns directorial sloth and requires the board to exercise
meaningful oversight. Directors who shirk these responsibilities, and
firms that erect "accountability repellents," do so in violation of this
norm. Private enforcers who call attention to these violations are
therefore shaming the offenders in much the same way as ajudge who
orders a corporate polluter or price fixer to make a public confession
of guilt.
With both judicial and private enforcers, we need to keep our eyes
on the same two issues: the enforcer's information and her incentives
or motives. The information problem is quite simple: it is often
extremely difficult to assess blame after the fact. The managers of a
firm whose midlevel officers have engaged in rampant price-fixing
may have genuinely sought to prevent such misbehavior, or they may
have deliberately looked the other way. The managers are sometimes
blameworthy when a firm performs badly, but underperformance can
also stem from forces beyond their control. Even if the enforcer's aim
is true-she wishes to shame only the shameful, not the unfortunate-
these information effects seriously complicate the decision whether,
and how, to shame a corporate offender.
Given the limitations of twenty-twenty hindsight, an obvious
solution is for enforcers to rely on simple, objective yardsticks; that is
precisely what we will see. For instance, courts focus on whether a
firm that was caught price-fixing had an internal compliance system in
place. Similarly, shareholder activists place significant weight on
readily verifiable factors, such as the number of independent directors
on the board of directors."
Even when we have no reservations about the enforcer's motives,
information problems complicate the use of shaming sanctions, just as
they complicate judicial intervention in corporate law generally. It is a
bit unrealistic to assume that enforcers' motives are always pristine,
which leads to the second issue: the possibility that an enforcer's
motives are suspect. Although we like to think of judges as neutral
For a discussion of this transition in corporate norms, see Eisenberg, supra note
45, at 1265-71. The term "accountability repellent" comes from Nell Minow. Minow
Inteniew, supra note 3.
Other corporate governance yardsticks include whether the board of directors
has nominating and audit committees controlled by disinterested directors and
whether all of the directors own stock in the corporation.
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and detached, some judges may treat the shaming of a large
corporation as a way to enhance their own reputation, even if the
corporation's actions do not really deserve this treatment. 4 An activist
shareholder may have a similarly distorted perspective if she has a
personal stake in the outcome.5 With private enforcers who do not
have a significant ownership interest, the risk of ulterior motives may
be particularly high and, in general, private enforcers seem more
likely to have problematic motives than judicial enforcers.
With both limited information and pernicious motives, the
seriousness of the problem depends on the behavior of other
participants in the shaming process. Enforcers' limited information
and need to rely on readily verifiable factors is most troubling if the
enforcement community has similarly poor information. Similarly,
enforcers' motives are only problematic if the relevant community will
carry out even an inappropriate shaming sanction.
A final consideration regarding private enforcers is cost. Cost is a
crucial variable in the corporate context because the relevant
community-say, all shareholders of a large corporation-will
frequently be far flung. Placing an advertisement in the Wall Street
Journal to shame the directors of Sears, for instance, cost Robert
Monks well over $100,000. Because of the high cost of placing such
advertisements, enforcers' ability to attract national media attention,
and thus free publicity of the shaming effort, dramatically enhances
the likelihood that shaming will have an effect. Judicial enforcers do
not face the same cost constraints since they can require the offending
firm to bear the cost of the public shaming.
B. The Audience or Enforcement Community
Because shaming sanctions succeed only if the relevant
community enforces them, the community can serve as a check on
wayward enforcers. Shaming skeptics worry that the community will
54 Judge Sarokin's outspoken criticism of the tobacco company defendants during
the early stages of a class action lawsuit may be an illustration of this, although his
statements no doubt also reflected genuine outrage. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 48,
at 962 n.10 (noting thatJudge Sarokin was subsequently disqualified from the case).
15 For example, a shareholder who is waging a proxy fight to take control of a
firm's board of directors, and who shames the current directors during the battle, may
care more about winning than about the appropriateness of the shaming sanction.
56 The full-page ad cost $100,000, and Monks incurred significant additional costs,
such as the expense of hiring Ronald Reagan's former speechwriter to write the text.
Minow Interview, supra note 3. For a detailed discussion of the Sears battle, see infra
Part III.B.
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not play this role effectively; not only may it carry out sanctions it
should ignore, but the community's enforcement efforts may spiral
out of control. As we saw earlier, according to James Whitman,
shaming is "a form of lynch justice," and the enforcement community
has a dangerous "tendency... to become either a mob or a collection
of petty private prison guards." 7 These images of riots and lynch
mobs may seem a bit far-fetched in corporate law, but overzealous
enforcement is a real concern. We can generalize the issue, and
subdue the lurid imagery still further, by asking two simple questions
in any given context: can the relevant audience distinguish desirable
shaming efforts from undesirable ones, and will it respond
appropriately?
To answer these questions, we must first determine what
constitutes the relevant community. For shareholder activists and
other private enforcers, the relevant audience is generally the firm's
shareholders and, on occasion, the peers and friends of the firm's
managers."' In contrast, judicial shaming efforts often have a more
diffuse target, such as the consumers of products made by the
offending firm.
The other two factors we should consider are the same two
variables we explored in our discussion of enforcers: limited
information and the likely motives of the audience. Very often, it is
the interaction of these factors, rather than either information or
motive alone, that determines whether we can have confidence in the
audience. The reason is that even in a close-knit community, the
audience usually has less information than either the enforcer or the
offender. If community members have reason to shame only the
shameworthy, they will take both their own limited information and
the reliability of the enforcer into account as they respond to the
shaming sanction. It is only in communities with less desirable
incentives that problems arise.
Xhere do these undesirable incentives come from? A key variable
is whether, and to what extent, the community internalizes or
externalizes the effects of its enforcement activities. If the benefits
and costs of shaming remain within the community, the community is
Whitman, supra note 31, at 1089; see also Kreimer, supra note 28, at 34-50
(describing the dangers of private party responses to governmental disclosures).
One of the reasons that Robert Monks's and Nell Minow's shaming
advertisements have been effective, in their view, is that they are seen by family,
friends, and peers of the directors, rather than just by shareholders. See infra Part III.B
(discussing the Sears battle).
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less likely to shame inappropriately. For example, the ranchers in
Robert Ellickson's pioneering study of Shasta County rely in part on
shaming to enforce community norms and the effects of the shaming
are largely internalized.59 The shaming of Southern merchants who
served blacks in the Jim Crow era is an illustration of shaming that had
external effects, since blacks were excluded from the relevant
community yet bore most of the costs of the shaming. 
'
Although much of the corporate shaming we will consider is
internalized by the relevant community, corporate shaming can also
have external effects. Perhaps the best example of this was Wall
Street's initial response to the onset of the takeover era of the late
1970s and 1980s. Prior to the takeover boom, a strong norm
prohibited Wall Street banks from financing or advising hostile
takeover bidders.6' In the small, close-knit community of Wall Street
financiers, a bank that violated that norm would be shamed by its
peers.! This norm had obvious effects on outside parties, not least on
the shareholders of target firms who lost the chance of receiving a
takeover premium. The speed with which the norm collapsed once
Morgan Stanley broke ranks by agreeing to participate in a hostile bid
for Inco is a tribute both to the inefficiency of the norm and the
corrective power of market forces when the costs of an inefficient
norm come to substantially outweigh its benefits.
Another illustration of corporate shaming that may have had
external effects came in the Delaware Supreme Court's important
decision in Paramount Communications v. QVC Network.5' In this case,
the court added an extraordinary appendix to the end of the case
expressly shaming the well-known Texas trial lawyer Joe Jamail.'
Taking angry exception to Jamail's representation of a Paramount
director during a deposition in the case, the court complained that he
"abused the privilege of representing a witness in a Delaware
proceeding, in that he: (a) improperly directed the witness not to
59 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrHoUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DIsPUTES (1991).
60 Norms theorists frequently cite Jim Crow discrimination as an illustration of an
inefficient norm. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Sodal Meaning, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 943, 965-66 (1995) (explaining why white southern business owners supported
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its antidiscrimination provisions).
61 Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1288.
62 For a discussion of this norm and its demise, see id. at 1287-91 (detailing
Moran Stanley's involvement in the hostile takeover bid for Inco).
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
64 Id. at 52-57.
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answer certain questions; (b) was extraordinarily rude, uncivil, and
vulgar; and (c) obstructed the ability of the questioner to elicit
testimony to assist the Court in this matter." ' The appendix is
remarkable in thatJamail's behavior was not even at issue in the case.
And because Jamail was neither a Delaware lawyer nor admitted pro
hac ice, the Delaware Supreme Court had no authority over him.66
We can view the glass here as either half empty or half full. It is
half full in that the court's insistence on high ethical standards
reinforces the moral dimension to Delaware's oversight of corporate
law. At the same time, however, the rebuke can also be seen as
highlighting the elite status of Delaware lawyers and the Delaware
corporate bar, as well as underscoring the importance of using
Delaware lawyers in Delaware cases. Rather than investment bankers
or the corporate bar, the offenders in the case studies we will explore
in the next Part are the firm and its directors, and the audience will
generally be the firm's shareholders or consumers. The shaming
principles, however, are very much the same.
C. The Target: Corporate and Individual Offenders
Much of our discussion of enforcers and enforcement
communities could be applied to any shaming discussion, corporate
or otherwise. As we turn to our final player, the target of a shaming
penalty, we take up the issues that make corporate shaming unique.
When corporate offenders are shamed, the target may be either the
corporation, an individual offender, or both.
1. Shaming the Corporation
While the "corporation" is simply an intangible entity which
cannot itself misbehave or commit a crime, corporations can be held
liable for a wide variety of offenses. By imposing liability on the
corporation, lawmakers hope to induce corporate managers to keep a
watchful eye on the behavior of the corporation's employees. 7 As a
general matter, this strategy-vicarious liability-enjoys widespread
approval. It is less clear, and there is more disagreement about, how
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 56-57.
See, .g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick". An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 407-08 (1981)
(describing the Chicago school approach, which favors punishing the corporation
rather than the individual decisionmaker).
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to implement the liability. Determining whether to hold corporate
offenders strictly liable, or, alternatively, to impose a duty-based
regime, turns out to be quite tricky." If a duty-based regime is in
place, the corporation is only liable when it violates a duty. As a
result, corporate managers may comply with the literal requirements
of the duty but eschew any preventive steps that are too ill-defined to
be detected by a court. A strict liability regime seems to eliminate this
problem since it gives firm managers an incentive to take preventive
steps so that the firm avoids paying a fine. But a strict liability regime
also gives managers a subtle and perverse incentive not to uncover
misbehavior once it has actually taken place; this is because the
corporation is actually worse off when it dredges up and is fined for
misbehavior that the government would not have detected. Thus,
"strict liability only encourages policing measures insofar as they
reduce the incidence of misconduct, but it perversely discourages
them insofar as they increase the firm's expected liability for
undeterred misconduct."6 9
Although the scholarly debate has focused on corporate fines, the
same reasoning also applies to corporate shaming. If courts impose
shaming sanctions on the firm without reference to fault, firms will
face the same mixed incentives."
How might the incentive problem be controlled? Corporate
liability theorists have proposed, among other things, a composite
liability regime consisting of two different levels of liability.7' In this
68 Jennifer Arlen has explored the problems discussed in the text that follows at
length in important recent work. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994) (describing how a simple
economic approach faiLls to account for certain aspects of corporate crime); Jennifer
Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate
Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997) (evaluating a spectrum of possible
liability regimes for corporate actors).
69 Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 68, at 707.
70 Although it seems counterintuitive to speak of shaming an inanimate entity like
a firm, the reputational consequences to a firm when it engages in illegal behavior and
the behavior is discovered can be enormous. For a detailed assessment, see Jonathan
M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing
Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 796 (1993). See also Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Event Studies and the Law 21-22 (Nov. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (summarizing the scholarly literature and concluding that
governmental recalls may have a greater impact than private products liability
litigation). This suggests that shaming penalties can have a dramatic effect on the
reputation of a firm and indirectly on the employees associated with it, at least if the)
publicize misbehavior that has not been fully publicized already.
7 i Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 68, at 726-28.
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hybrid regime, courts would impose a standard penalty on every
corporate offender, without regard to fault.y2 Only if the firm failed to
police itself effectively would it bear the additional, second-level
sanction. '  This is where shaming might come in. By including
shaming in their arsenal of second-level sanctions, courts could
reinforce the message that corporations are expected to monitor
themselves for misbehavior while adding an alternative means of
punishing firms that fail to do so.
I do not mean to suggest that composite liability is a perfect
solution. Like all duty-based approaches, the second step of
composite liability can be subverted if courts cannot easily determine
whether the firm has monitored itself adequately. Even with this
limitation, however, composite liability offers obvious benefits over a
more traditional strict liability regime, and shaming fits neatly into
this approach.
Before we move from corporate to individual offenders, we should
briefly consider an issue I glossed over at the outset of this discussion:
should corporations ever face criminal liability or should corporate
liability be exclusively civil in nature? Although corporate criminal
liability is popular in the statute books, it does not have nearly so
impressive a following in the scholarly community. Critics point out
that corporate entities cannot have the mens rea traditionally
required for criminal liability and question whether the procedural
protections of criminal law make sense when the defendant is a
14corporation.
Despite these concerns, criminal liability might still make sense if
criminal shaming has a greater impact than shaming under a civil
statute. This seems doubtful, however, when the offender is a
corporation. For example, when Denny's, and later Texaco, were
sued for alleged discrimination, the fact that the lawsuits were civil
rather than criminal in nature seems unlikely to have diminished the
damnage to the firms' reputations.75 The key issue in these cases was
Id. at 726.
Id.
See. e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
319, 321 (1996) (arguing that corporate criminal liability is inappropriate when civil
remedies are available); Khanna, supra note 26, at 1479-84 (tracing the shift in beliefs
that a corporation could have intent);Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for Destruction: The Case
of Corporate Crimninal Liability, 17 MvANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 381, 382 (1996)
(arguing that "the doctrine of corporate criminal liability violates virtually every basic
principle of criminal law").
7- See, e.g., Neela Banerjee, 75 Blacks at Texaco Sue for Arbiters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
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whether the relevant audience believed that the behavior in question
truly was shameworthy.
Our analysis of corporate shaming thus suggests that we should
cast at least a tepid vote for the scholars who wish to get rid of
corporate criminal liability.76 But our insights should apply both in a
world with corporate criminal liability and one in which corporate
offenders face only civil sanctions.
2. Shaming Individual Managers
Shifting from corporate to individual offenders complicates the
analysis in intriguing ways. In the discussion that follows, I start with
several issues that arise even under the most straightforward of cases,
where there is no risk of an excessive community response and we
assume that all managers are equally responsive to shaming sanctions.
I then turn to questions such as the risk of an excessive response and
conclude by asking what kinds of managers are most (or least) likely
to respond to shaming.
The most serious concern with imposing individual liability of any
sort-whether a monetary penalty or shaming-is the risk that liability
will have too great an effect on managers' behavior. Unlike an
ordinary investor, who can diversify her investments, managers have
7
an enormous stake in the fortunes of the firm they manage. Having
so many eggs in the same basket makes managers risk averse to start
with; if a significant risk of liability were added to this, the reasoning
goes, managers might be unwilling to take even the smallest and most
ordinary of risks.
Firms have long counteracted the chilling effect of potential
liability by providing insurance and indemnification for their
2000, at C4 (describing the Texaco settlement of a lawsuit by black employees for
racial discrimination); David M. Herszenhom, Punitive Actions Are Advised in
Discrimination at Denny's, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at B4 (referring to prior class
action lawsuits against Denny's in the context of continued racial discrimination at the
restaurant chain).
76 The best reason to retain corporate criminal liability may be a purely practical
one: the corporate case can be coordinated with any criminal litigation involing
individual offenders. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 26, at 1529-30 (arguing that
although the "enforcement features of corporate criminal liability are sometimes
desirable," civil liability using such enforcement features is a better option).
7 This is most true with managers who are both directors and high-level officers of
the firm, such as the CEO. As noted below, outside directors may be risk averse for
other reasons, such as the fact that the risk of liability may dwarf the benefits to them
of their interest in the firm.
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managers.", But notice how shaming sanctions complicate this
strategy, at least for cases that are litigated to judgment. If a court
holds that a manager breached her fiduciary duties, insurance may
cover the financial liability, but it is not much help against a shaming
sanction." A shaming sanction may have serious consequences for a
manager's reputation and firms cannot easily insulate their managers
against the threat. For outside directors, shaming may loom even
larger since they generally have much less of a financial stake in the
firm to offset the reputational consequences of being shamed."
Although the chilling effect should make us wary about individual
liability, there are good reasons not to let the buck stop at the
corporate level. If the corporation has limited assets or substantial
debt, for instance, its inability to pay a potential fine may diminish the
deterrence value of the fine."" Individual liability is thus an important
supplement to corporate liability. Rather than abandoning indidual
liability, a better solution is to attempt to limit it to clear
misbehaior. Indeed, we see this impulse both in corporate law
7, For an extensive recent discussion of insurance and indemnification patterns,
ee Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 887, 901-05 (1999). In those cases where managers are found liable, the managers
face the double-whammy of reputational and monetary penalties, even without explicit
shaning. Set e.g., Michael J. Whincop, Reintroducing Releases of Officer Liability into
Australian Corporate Law, 26 MONASH U. L. REV. 15, 22-23 (2000) (describing the
reputational effects of violating corporate norms).
It is more difficult to shame individual offenders where the parties settle the
case, as they veiy frequently do in the context of private shareholder litigation. If the
case settles, the court's only real opportunity to shame an individual offender may be
in a wTitten opinion deciding a preliminary motion or reviewing the proposed
settlement. The Caremark case, In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959
(Del. Ch. 1996), which I consider in detail infra in Part III.C, was a review of a
proposed settlement.
Outside directors' susceptibility to shaming suggests that both the benefits and
the risks of shaming may be greatest with these directors. Shaming is more likely to
influence their behavior, but the prospect of inappropriate shaming may discourage
would-be directors from serving.
Theoretically, if lawmakers wished to achieve optimal deterence, they would
need to increase a firm's liability to reflect the fact that the likelihood of detecting
misbehavior is much less than 100%. That is, the liability should be based on the harm
multiplied by the probability of detection. This would require enormous fines in many
cases-more than most firms could pay. See Coffee, supra note 67, at 389-90
(discussing the "inability to set an adequate punishment cost which does not exceed
the corporation's resources").
"_, Even Bruce Chapman, who makes a powerful case for imposing liability only on
the firm for corporate torts, concludes that individual liability is appropriate if the
individual offender lacked good faith and benefited from the misbehavior. Bruce
Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1679, 1700-02 (1996).
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doctrine and in actual insurance policies, which tend to exclude
intentional wrongs from their coverage. This same strategy can be
used with shaming sanctions.
A third issue, the "mob psychology" concern that Whitman and
others have raised, moves us beyond the most straightforward cases
and into the distinctive features of corporate shaming." Suppose two
or three managers of a corporate polluter are singled out for blame
and subject to a shaming sanction-say, a court-ordered apology in
several national newspapers that identifies them by name and
position. Although the sanction is unlikely to lead to riots, the
offenders could be subject to excessive punishment by one or more
relevant communities. Other firms might be reluctant to hire them
for fear that government regulators will closely scrutinize any firm that
associates itself with the offending managers. The managers' names
also could be seriously tarnished within their local community."'
It is hard to know how likely a community is to overreact to a
shaming sanction, but the risk does not seem trivial. Though runaway
enforcement seems somewhat unlikely for the managers of a
corporate polluter, one can easily imagine overreaction to cases
involving politically charged issues such as sex or race discrimination.
In these contexts, the risk of an excessive reaction might counsel in
favor of limiting any shaming sanction to the corporation rather than
pinpointing individual managers.85
Up to now, I have assumed that all managers are essentially the
same and will be equally responsive to shaming sanctions. This is not
true, however. A final question, then, is what kinds of managers will
be the most (or least) susceptible to shaming sanctions?
Because shaming undermines an offender's reputation, one
would expect to find a direct correlation between responsiveness and
the importance of reputation. This suggests that managers who have
less need to establish a reputation for cooperation will be more
difficult to shame. If a manager's skills are so valuable that people will
transact with her regardless of her reputation, or if she actually
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
84 Kreimer discusses these kinds of concerns in some detail. See, e.g., Kreimer,
supra note 28, at 35-50 (describing retaliation by private parties after disclosure); id. at
144-45 (describing cases in which publicity is particularly likely to have a chilling
effect).
85 We might also have concerns about shaming the corporation in this context,
especially when it is done by private rather than judicial enforcers. Private enforcers
can use the threat of shaming to extort value from a firm, as may sometimes be the
case when activists threaten boycotts.
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benefits from a reputation as a "bad" type, shaming sanctions are less
likely to prove effective." High-tech managers may be an illustration
of the first of these factors (at least before the recent downturn in
Silicon Valley), and corporate raiders have sometimes personified the
second."' It is conceivable that companies engaged in morally
borderline businesses could use these kinds of considerations
strategically by hiring managers who are unusually impervious to
shaming sanctions. The tobacco companies, for example, are
sometimes accused of this and liquor manufacturers may have fit this
description in an earlier age. For such a company, shaming sanctions
would obviously be less effective than in other contexts.
D. Concluding Thoughts
In taking on all of corporate shaming, I have brought a wide
variety of different practices under a single umbrella. Everything from
the criminal penalties handed down by a court under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to campaigns by shareholder activists seeking
to rally their fellow shareholders can involve shaming. Despite the
diversity, we can make sense of the pitfalls and promises of shaming by
focusing on a small number of factors. For both the enforcer and the
relevant audience, two factors loom especially large: limited
information and the parties' incentives or motives. With the final
party, the offender, the most important issues are who to shame and
how to shame them.
Throughout the discussion, I have assumed that shaming
sanctions have a meaningful, independent effect. This is a plausible
assumption in most contexts, as we shall see. In some instances,
however, as with misbehavior that has already received wide publicity,
the additional impact of shaming may not be so clear. Duplicative
shaming obviously has much less to offer as a sanction, and we will
need to take into account the possibility that shaming may be
o s, upra note 22. An additional consideration is whether an offender has
internalized the community's norm. If not, she will respond to a shaming sanction
only if failing to do so will have tangible, external consequences.
,7 The managers of Silicon Valley firms are widely perceived to be much less
reputationally sensitive than managers of more traditional firms. As an illustration, a
leading shareholder activist described to me a story involving a Silicon Valley manager
who, after receiving a letter from a group of nuns asking that the firm consider adding
a female director, %Tote a scathing response pointing out that the nuns had used a
signature stamp, rather than signing their letter by hand. Minow Interview, supra note
3.
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pointless."
III. CORPORATE SHAMING IN ACTION: THREE CASE STUDIES
Having looked at some of the theoretical issues raised by
corporate shaming, it is time to go down into the trenches. The three
case studies that follow cover the entire range of corporate shaming.
We will begin with several prominent illustrations of shaming by
private enforcers, including the rosters of shame published by
CaPERS and the financial press and the ad campaigns waged by
Robert Monks and Nell Minow against the directors of Sears and
several other boards of directors. Turning to judicial enforcers, we
then will focus at length on a price-fixing case involving Caremark
Industries. The Caremark case raises all of the corporate and
individual liability issues we explored earlier, and we will consider how
shaming sanctions might be used in such a case.89
A. Rosters of Shame: CalPERS and the Business Press
1. CalPERS's "Focus List" of Underperforming Finns
Americans are obsessed with lists. Many are designed to exalt-
the "all-twentieth-century" baseball team, for instance-and others are
designed to rebuke. Shareholder activists and the business press use a
similar technique to bring pressure on U.S. firms. The most sustained
and dramatic example of this is the annual "focus list" published by
CalPERS, California's state pension fund for public employees."'
Because CalPERS, like other public and private pension funds, invests
a substantial portion of the assets it manages in stock, it has been one
of the nation's largest stockholders for many years.91 As institutional
8 See infra Part III.C (discussing this possibility with corporate scandals).
89 See supra Part II.C (comparing the effect on behavior of shaming individuals
with the effect of shaming corporations).
90 The Council of Institutional Investors ("CII)-an organization comprised of
representatives from public pension funds, private funds, and other institutions-
publishes an analogous "focus list." As with the CaIPERS list, at least one study
suggests that the CII focus list has had a significant, positive effect on the value of firms
that make the list. Tim C. Opler & Jonathan Sokobin, Does Coordinated Institu-
tional Activism Work? An Analysis of the Council of Institutional Investors (May 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://fisher.osu.edu/fin/
faculty/opler/ciiweb/.
91 See CaPERS, CaIPERS 2000 Focus Lis; http://www.calpers-govemance.org/
alert/focus/2000/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2001) (listing recent CalPERS holdings and
shareholder actions).
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shareholders have taken an increasingly active role in monitoring the
firms whose stock they hold, public pension funds have led the way,
and CalPERS has embraced the new activism with more relish than
an), other.
Even CalPERS cannot actively oversee every firm in its portfolio,
so it has developed an elaborate system for determining the firms in
which to invest its energies for any given year. To narrow down its list
to a chosen few, CalPERS considers three different factors: (1)
shareholder returns for the last three years; (2) the economic value-
added, as determined by a test conducted by Stern Stewart & Co.; and
(3) a "corporate governance" screen, which looks for red flags such as
a majority of inside directors on the board or a class of stock with
disproportionate voting power."' The goal of the process is to identify
firms that "are both poor economic performers and have corporate
governance structures that do not ensure full accountability to
company owners.""
Once it has assembled a list-the so-called "long list"-of firms
that scored lowest on both its economic and corporate governance
tests, CalPERS's next step is to sit down for a chat with directors of the
firms "to discuss performance and governance issues."94  CalPERS
generally has no trouble arranging these private chats for a simple
and obvious reason: both CaPERS and the directors know that
CalPERS is likely to take action, such as launching a proxy contest, if
the fund gets no response.
Nothing I have described thus far sounds much like shaming;
indeed, if CalPERS held its conversations with underperforming
directors and then aimed its proxy contest weapons at the boards that
refused to listen, we could just jump to the next illustration. But that
is not all that CaPERS does. After its chats, CalPERS assembles
another, shorter list of the firms that "continue to merit public and
market attention."95 These nine or ten firms are CalPERS's "focus
list." CalPERS trumpets its focus list with a press release naming the
firms and explaining the inadequacies that landed each firm on the
list."" One obvious benefit of the list is informational-it alerts
" Ca1PERS, Focus List Selection Process, http://www.calpers-govemance.org/alert/
focus/1999/ (last xisited Mar. 2, 2001).
Id.
'3 Id.
Id.
The 1999 press release announced, for instance, that "Tyson Foods, Inc. and
Circus Circus Enterprises head [CalPERS's] list of Corporate America's poorest
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shareholders and the market about the firms' problems and generates
support for CalPERS's subsequent efforts. But there is a moral
component as well. CalPERS clearly intends to blame the offending
firms.
The list of changes CalPERS has induced is quite remarkable.
Regarding the firms on its 2000 focus list, for instance, CalPERS
persuaded one to separate the Chief Executive and Chair of the Board
positions (Bob Evans Farms), three to require a majority of
independent directors (Crown Cork and Seal, A.G. Edwards, and
Phycor), and two to designate a lead independent director (First
Union Corp. and Intergraph Corp.).97  When CalPERS talks,
corporate America listens; there is no question about that.
Just how shaming--the "blame" component-fits into this picture
is less clear, however. The list of underperforming firms is the most
visible manifestation of CalPERS's monitoring efforts, but it is only a
small piece of the overall strategy. Directors listen to CaPERS
because they know that CalPERS will spring into action if the directors
do not adequately respond. Indeed, CalPERS limits its focus list to
firms in which it holds at least $2 million worth of stock for precisely
this reason: to make sure it "has a large enough holding to justify the
resource commitment necessary to effect change."98
Why, with all this artillery in place, does CalPERS even bother to
publish its roster of shame? One benefit, no doubt, is that the
publicity paves the way for a proxy contest if such action becomes
necessary. CalPERS also believes, however, that publishing the names
and shortcomings of the firms has an independent reputational effect.
The shame of association with a focus list firm is sufficiently
embarrassing that it makes directors more willing to accede to
governance change. As CalPERS's former general counsel explains,
"[t]he shaming aspect is very important. Firms hate to be on the
performers released today." Press Release, CalPERS Releases List of Nine Corporate
America's Poorest Financial and Economic Performers (Apr. 21,. 1999), available at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/whatsnew/press/1999/O421a.htm. The release then
explained why these two firms were singled out for particular attention: "Tyson
Foods... landed on the corporate laggards list because of its poor stock performance
and use of a dual class stock structure." Id. The sins of Circus Circus had nothing to
do with gambling and everything to do with "stock performance [that] is less than its
peers and.., a board that is insufficiently independent of management." Id.
97 See CalPERS, supra note 91 (setting forth the number of shares owned by
CalPERS and the changes to ailing companies proposed by CaPERS).
98 CalPERS, CalPERS' Screening Process, http://www.calpers-governance.org/alert/
focus/1999/screening-process.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2001).
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So shaming works, or at least it seems to work. Whether we
should be encouraged or troubled by CalPERS's use of shaming is, of
course, a different question. Our answer to this question depends in
no small part on CalPERS itself-that is, the fund's motives or
incentives. When courts engage in shaming, they serve as ostensibly
disinterested enforcers of permissible behavior. CalPERS, by contrast,
has a direct stake in the outcome of its activities. The goal of
CalPERS's efforts is to increase the value of its holdings for the benefit
of retired California employees. Because the managers of CalPERS
are public officials, political factors may influence their
decisionmaking, which suggests that their motives are not entirely
objective. The need to justify their results in terms of shareholder
value, however, is likely to have a restraining effect on pure political
activism, particularly with actions such as a proxy contest that will
ultimately require a shareholder vote.'°°
Although CalPERS's stated aim seems laudable on the whole, the
selection process for its focus list illustrates some of the information
problems we considered in the last Part."' CalPERS's corporate
governance screen is designed to isolate firms that are dominated by
insiders, and CalPERS devotes much of its energies to achieving
simple structural changes such as establishing an independent
board."'2 An obvious reason for this is that even a sophisticated
investor like CalPERS often cannot know exactly why a firm is
underperforming, and, therefore, must rely on broad yardsticks. In
effect, CaPERS assumes that if a firm has performed badly and does
.1. Telephone Interview with Richard Koppes, former General Counsel, CalPERS
(Oct. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Koppes Interview]. CalPERS does not publish its annual
focus list until February, at the outset of the proxy season, to maximize this effect. Id.
1- Ed Rock and Roberta Romano have both emphasized that the activism of
public pension funds may reflect the personal and political aspirations of the fund
leaders rather than solely an interest in maximizing the value of the fund's stock. See
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism,
79 GEO. LJ. 445 (1991) (discussing the significance of episodic shareholder action by
pension funds); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993) (noting that public pension funds are
faced with investment conflicts that limit shareholder action). CalPERS itself hints at
these mixed motives in its own mission statement, which refers not just to the goal of
increasing stock value, but also to CalPERS's commitment to the public interest. See
CaIPERS, supra note 91.
Jol See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing the need to use objective
yardsticks).
J,, CalPERS, Corporate Governance Screen, http://ww.calpers-governance.org/
alert/focus/1999/screen.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2001).
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not have an independent board, the board's lack of independence is
one reason for the bad performance.
The problem with this strategy is that it is not clear that firms
honoring the disinterestedness norm perform better than firms whose
directors are interested. As Bernard Black, the leading commentator
on shareholder activism, concludes, "there is no compelling evidence
that greater board independence improves overall firm performance,
and some evidence that inside and affiliated directors play useful
roles." °3 Black's conclusions about other priorities of CalPERS and its
peers are equally deflating. Although "[a] ctivist institutions generally
support [independent] ... nominating and compensation commit-
tees," for instance, the leading study "finds no evidence that the
existence of these committees or their staffing affects firm
performance."
0 4
On the other hand, in keeping with CalPERS's generally benign
motives and the stakes of its shareholder audience, there is no
evidence that these activities are affirmatively harmful, and at least
some evidence that a beneficial "CalPERS effect" exists when
institutional shareholders such as CalPERS prod firms to alter their
governance structure without waging a formal proxy fight."'
Moreover, CalPERS's effectiveness depends in no small part on its
incentive to increase the value of the firms it monitors. If an entity
with no financial interest used the same kinds of shaming techniques,
shareholders and the firms' managers would respond quite
differently. To some extent, at least, the enforcement community-
here, the firms' other shareholders-acts as a check.
Is there anything further we can say about the nature of the firms
on which CalPERS's focus list has its greatest effect? I suggested in the
last Part that the boards of traditional firms may be more susceptible
103 Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United
States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 463
(Peter Newman ed., 1998). In a careful examination of the existing empirical
evidence, Jonathan Karpoff reaches similarly pessimistic conclusions about the impact
of shareholder activism. SteJonathan M. Karpoff, The Impact of Shareholder Activism
on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings (Sept. 8, 1998) (unpublished
mansucript, on file with author) (discussing studies that suggest that shareholder
activism induces change in governance structures, but that provide less evidence
of increases in the value of the target firm's stock), available at http://
faculty.washington.edu/-karpoff/Sapaper.doc.
104 Black, supra note 103, at 463.
105 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism
a Valuable Mechanism 8 (Oct. 26, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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to shaming than newer, high-tech firms."' CalPERS's former general
counsel agrees that its efforts have been most effective with traditional
firms, but offers a different explanation for the correlation: size and
prominence."" CalPERS's focus list works best when the national
press takes an interest in its selections. CalPERS is far more likely to
get extensive media coverage when it shames a firm whose name we
all know than when it shames a medium-sized ("midcap")
corporation.""
One thing we almost never see on CalPERS's focus list is a
reference to individual managers. The focus list shames
underperforming firms, but rarely targets managers individually.
CalPERS's failure to name names is at least mildly puzzling since we
might expect shaming that singles out particular individuals to have a
greater effect than more generalized shaming. This, too, is a
manifestation of CalPERS's overall governance strategy. CalPERS
relies heavily on private negotiations that might be undermined if
CalPERS singled out the directors by name. 9 When we examine two
shareholder activists, Robert Monks and Nell Minow, in Part III.B, we
will see a much greater willingness to name names.
2. Shaming by the Financial Press: Fortune and Business Week
Shareholder activists are not the only nonjudicial enforcers who
use shaming techniques to punish wayvard firms and their managers.
The financial press-Fortune, Business Week, and their competitors-
make regular use of the same kinds of techniques.
Now, nearly every issue of these magazines includes at least one
story that looks somewhat like shaming. Investigative reports, such as
the articles that appear daily on the side columns of the Wall Street
Journal's front page, cast cold light on particular firms and individuals
and have enormous reputational effects. I will return to journalism of
this sort, which does not overtly blame the individuals and firms in
question, at the end of this Part. In the discussion that follows, we will
focus on journalism that looks much more like explicit shaming.
Fortune's and Business Week's reports on the "best and worst boards" are
See supra Part II.C (discussing various targets of corporate shaming).
Koppes Interview, supra note 99.
Id.
CalPERS's unwillingness to name names may also reflect the fund's own
bureaucratic structure and its sensitivity as a state agency to political considerations.
See, e.g., Minow Interview, supra note 3.
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the most familiar illustration, and these lists will occupy our attention
in the paragraphs that follow.
One of the first recent efforts to systematically identify the
nation's worst corporate boards was a 1996 article in Business Week
entitled, appropriately enough, The Best and Worst Boards."" Business
Week has followed up this article with several subsequent articles on
board performance, each of which uses interviews and a set of
evaluative criteria to identify the nation's twenty-five best and twenty-
five worst boards of directors."' Although its methodology is
somewhat less elaborate, Fortune, too, has published several articles
listing and criticizing the worst boards of the year."2
The selection strategy used by the financial press is broadly similar
to the strategy used by CalPERS on its annual focus list. In its initial
article, Business Week emphasized the virtues of a vigorous board.
"Perhaps the most important quality," the article suggests, "is directors
who are active, critical participants in determining a company's
strategies."" 3 "Another crucial component of top-ranked boards is
director independence. Governance experts believe that a majority of
directors should be free of all ties to either the CEO or the
company."' 14 The boards that made both magazines' lists of laggards
almost invariably failed to meet these standards of vigor and
independence. Business Week chastised H.J. Heinz for a "[b]oard
loaded with insiders," Archer Daniels Midland because of its "lack of
independence," and Rollins Environmental because its board is
"[p]robably the least independent board of any public company.""
'
Fortune lambasted Maxxam as "a textbook of governance worst
practices" because its "board has just five members: [Maxxam's CEO],
[its] COO, its outside lawyer, another lawyer, and a former
accountant.""' 6
Each of these statements could easily have come from CalPERS or
individual activists like Robert Monks and Nell Minow. Despite the
striking similarity between the approaches of Business Week and Fortune
110 John A. Byrne & Richard Melcher, The Best and Worst Boards, BUS. WK., Nov. 25,
1996, at 82.
I See, e.g., John A. Byrne et al., The Best and Worst Boards: Our Special Report on
Corporate Governance, BUS. WK., Dec. 8, 1997, at 90.
2 See, e.g., Geoffrey Colvin, America's lVorst Boards, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2000, at 241.
3 Byrne et al., supra note 111, at 91.
14 Id. at92.
"1 Id. at93.
16 Colvin, supra note 112, at 242.
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and those of other enforcers, however, these journals bring very
different credentials. The most important distinction is the journals'
lack of a direct stake in the firms they shame. Although
disinterestedness is prized in most contexts, the fact that CalPERS and
other shareholder activist enforcers put their money where their
mouths are gives them credibility; if a shareholder activist's shaming
effort is misguided, the enforcer itself loses too. The credibility of
Business leek, Fortune, and their peers must come from somewhere
else, since the) do not hold stock (we hope) in the firms they shame.
That somewhere else is reputation, which we will consider in more
detail in a moment.
Another difference between shareholder enforcers and the
financial press is that the financial press can publish a roster of shame
at a much lower cost. Because Business Week and Fortune have already
committed to filling their pages, the marginal cost to them of
publishing an article on the nation's "worst boards" is very low. For
private shareholder activists, by contrast, the cost of publicizing the
sins of offending managers and firms can be quite high. (The
additional costs to CalPERS are less dramatic, since CalPERS's press
releases often are covered by the national media.) Because financial
journals, unlike shareholder activists, never engage in proxy
solicitations, they also are spared the cost of complying with SEC
disclosure requirements when they criticize managers in print.
In addition to the distinctions I have noted, the financial journal
articles may seem to lack the blame component of true shaming. In
some respects, the "worst boards" articles can be seen as mere
criticism of poor performance. Yet they also have aspects of true
shaming. When Business IWeek complains that Disney's "meek,
handpicked" board "won the dubious distinction of being named the
worst" in America, it is making a moral statement as well as a business
117
one.
An obvious concern with media enforcers is that their attacks will
be sensationalized in order to sell magazines. This brings us back to
why reputation is so important to the financial press. In many
countries-think of Russia, for example-media shaming might have
little effect because the principal audience of investors would not trust
the accuracy of the attacks. In the United States, investors might
respond similarly if the National Enquirer or World published its own
roster of corporate shame. The shameless generally do not make
17 B)Tne et al., supra note 111, at 90.
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successful shamers.
Business Week and its peers, by contrast, have a huge reputational
stake in the accuracy-or at the least, the objectivity-of their
reports."8  Readers buy the magazines because they offer
sophisticated, inside looks at the business world. Under these
circumstances, a roster of shame can have a powerful effect and there
is some evidence that it does. A year after its 1996 "Worst Boards"
article, Business Week reported that the featured firms were "battered
by investor criticism," and that "many of the ... boards... are trying
to shape up": AT&T, DowJones, and Waste Management brought on
new, more respected directors; Apple Computer overhauled its much-
criticized board; ADM, Champion International, and Fleming
embraced more liberal governance guidelines."9 Other observers are
more skeptical as to how effective the Business Week and Fortune articles
have been.'20 Business journals face many of the same informational
limitations as shareholder activists, and they too tend to focus on
objective yardsticks, such as the number of outside directors on a
board. As we have seen, these yardsticks can be mimicked even by bad
firms. Skeptics believe that the Business Week column, in attempting to
assess the rank order of hundreds of firms, puts too much weight on
these simple yardsticks. 21 Although each of the yardsticks alone may
have some value, each is a very rough proxy and the errors multiply
when the measures are combined. As a result, as Nell Minow
complains, a firm often turns up at the bottom of the list one year and
at the top a year later.
2
B. Naming and Shaming: The Sears Battle and Beyond
The six-hundred-pound gorillas of shareholder activism are public
and quasi-public pensions such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF, but a
small group of individual activists have also made waves in corporate
governance. Indeed, shareholder activists Robert Monks and Nell
118 For a similar point, see Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55 J. FIN.
1623, 1628 (2000) (discussing Robert Monks's Sears ad, which prompted Sears to
implement his proposed changes). Zingales notes that "[i]n the United States,
newspapers have a tradition of being accurate and reliable. Readers rely on them to
form their opinions." Id.
19 Byrne et al., supra note 111, at 95.
120 See Minow Interview, supra note 3.
121 Id.
122 Id. Minow is more impressed with the rosters of shame that are being
published by two upstartjournals, CEO Magazine and Corporate Boards. Id.
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Minow can lay claim to having helped spur the previously dormant
pensions into action in the late 1980s-at the dawrn of the new age of
shareholder activism.' 2 Often working with sympathetic institutional
investors, Monks and Minow have challenged numerous recalcitrant
boards, from American Express to Eastman Kodak. 2 4 In the course of
a prolonged battle with the directors of Sears in the early 1990s,
Monks introduced an intriguing new shaming strategy: rather than
shaming only the corporation, or at most its CEO, Monks shamed all
of the board members by name.'25
Until the 1980s, Sears's rise was one of the great mom-and-apple
pie stories of American business. The famous Sears catalogue brought
an ever-expanding variety of goods to consumers who lived outside of
major urban markets.12 6 "By the 1970s," as Monks himself has noted,
"Sears accounted for a whole one percent of the gross national
product. Two in three Americans shopped at Sears within any three
months of 1972. " rI7
By the late 1980s, Sears's fortunes began to change. 8 Fleet-footed
competitors like Wal-Mart and K-Mart had cut into its retail base and
Sears's CEO, Ed Brennan, responded with a plan to offer competitive
prices and brand name merchandise. 9 Sears's stock continued to
languish, however, and institutional investors started calling for
radical surgery, such as spinning off Sears's money-making financial
U-4 Monks's and Minow's efforts go back to the mid 1980s, when Monks formed
Institutional Shareholder Services. Id. A turning point in their efforts, and in
shareholder activism generally, came on February 23, 1988, when the Department of
Labor sent a letter to Avon suggesting that pension fund managers had an obligation
to act as informed fiduciaries when they voted on corporate issues. Avon Prods. Inc.,
Dep't of Labor Letter Opinion, 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 391 (Feb. 23, 1988). Within a few
months, the Institutional Shareholder Services's client base mushroomed, and
institutional shareholders abandoned their practice of always voting in favor of the
position taken by the managers of the firms in which the institutions held stock,
Minow Interview, supra note 3; see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined,
89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 572 (1990) (noting the effect of the Avon letter on shareholder
voting, but suggesting that it did not prompt more sweeping activism).
4 Each of these battles is chronicled in ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1995); id. at 372-85 (American Express); id. at 440-44
(Eastman Kodak). I draw on their account of the Sears struggle in the discussion that
follows.
IL, Id. at 408-09.
r.' Id. at 399.
127 Id.
Id. at 400.
, Id. at 400-01.
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services businesses'3
Concluding that Sears, whose board showed no inclination to put
pressure on the CEO, might be an ideal vehicle for shareholder
activism, Monks launched a proxy contest to secure a seat for himself
on the Sears board in 1991.11 The managers of Sears responded by
taking aggressive steps to stymy the Monks bid.13 2  In addition to
reducing the size of the board, which increased the number of votes
Monks would need to capture a seat, Sears refused to let Monks have
the list of Sears shareholders."' In the end, Monks failed, but this
would not be the last that Sears heard from him.3 4 The following
year, Monks waged an active campaign to promote five proposals that
had been submitted by other shareholders. 35
It was at this point that Monks introduced his shaming strategy.
To promote the shareholder proposals, Monks purchased a full-page
advertisement in the Wall Street Journal' 36  At the top of the
advertisement was a large, attention grabbing, silhouette-like outline
of the nine Sears directors and a caption listing each by name and
position. 37 In enormous black letters, a headline beneath the picture
referred to the directors as Sears's "Non-Performing Assets," and the
text urged Sears's shareholders to support the five shareholder
130 Id. at 401.
131 Id. at 404.
132 Id. at 404-07.
Because Sears had cumulative voting in place, Monks initially needed only
sixteen percent of the votes to win one of the five available seats. Id. at 404. Reducing
the number of seats by three made it necessary for him to attract twenty-one percent.
Id. For a discussion of the intricacies of cumulative voting, see Amihai Glazer et al.,
Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing Strategy into the Equation, 35 S.C. L.
REV. 295 (1984).
To deny Monks access to a shareholder list, Sears contended in court that Monks
did not have a "proper purpose." MONKS & MINOW, supra note 124, at 405 (internal
quotation omitted); see also Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of
Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 331
(1996) (analyzing shareholders' use of state corporate law inspection statutes to get
information from corporations).
1 MONKS & MiNow, supra note 124, at 407-10.
135 The proposals called for making shareholder voting confidential, separating
the jobs of CEO and Chair of the Board, investigating the spinoff proposal, eliminating
staggered board terms, and requiring directors to invest in Sears stock. Id. at 409.
136 Id.
137The advertisement is reprinted on the next page. Monks used silhouettes
taken from a photo of the Sears directors, rather than the photo itself, for a simple
reason: Sears owned the copyright to the photo and obviously would not have agreed
to let Monks use it. Minow Interview, supra note 3.
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None of the proposals passed, but several received more than
forty percent of the shareholders' votes.' 9 Monks and Minow are
convinced that the advertisement played a crucial role in both the
votes and the subsequent actions of the Sears board.' Before Monks
published the ad, he and Minow promised to "go away" if the Sears
board hired any investment bank other than Goldman, Sachs, Sears's
long-term advisor, to assess whether splitting off the firm's financial
services would enhance shareholder value.' 4' Prior to the ad, the
directors did nothing. 4 1 Yet, within five months of the ad, the board
had done more than simply consider a divestment. In September, the
directors announced that the financial services businesses would be
spun off.
43
How could a single ad have had so much influence on a board
that had stoutly resisted Monks's more traditional efforts? Monks and
Minow believe that the picture forced Sears's outside directors to
internalize, or "take ownership" of, their responsibility for Sears's
fortunes.'4 Crucial to this effect was a shift in the relevant
enforcement community. "We were speaking beyond the board
members [and Sears shareholders]," Monks has written; "We were
speaking to their friends, their families, their professional associates.
Anyone seeing the ad would read it. Anyone reading it would
understand it. Anyone understanding it would feel free to ask
questions of any board member they encountered."4 5 The outside
directors had long simply followed the lead of CEO Ed Brennan and
his predecessors. Seeing their picture associated with the phrase
"Non-Performing Assets" prodded the directors out of their lethargy
and induced them to push for substantial change.
In the previous section, we briefly considered CalPERS's motives
when it shames underperforming firms.146 If anything, this issue is
even more pressing with activists like Monks and Minow who target
the directors individually, as they did with Sears. If shaming strikes
fear into the hearts of reputationally sensitive directors, we may have
139 Id. at 410.
140 Minow Interview, supra note 3.
141 Id.
14 Id.
143 MONKS & MINOw, supra note 124, at 410.
144 Minow Interview, supra note 3.
145 HILARY ROSENBERG, A TRAITOR TO HIs CLASS: ROBERT A.G. MONKS AND THE
BATE TO CHANGE CORPORATE AMERICA 269-70 (1999) (internal quotation omitted).
146 See supra Part IIIA.1.
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good reason to worry that it will be misused. This concern is
magnified, moreover, when the enforcement community includes not
just shareholders, but also friends, peers, and others.
Monks and Minow seem to have a variety of different motives,
including desires to play a visible role in corporate governance, to
effect change, and to establish a marketable niche. Even more
important than the precise mix of motives, however, is their need to
establish a reputation for credibility. Unless they target genuine
problems, other shareholders will not follow their lead, and
shareholders are their primary audience. This does not mean that
Monks and Minow invariably focus on shareholder value, of course,
but it has a crucial shaping effect on their efforts.47
Despite the apparent effectiveness of shaming advertisements, this
strategy has not become a standard weapon when shareholder activists
challenge an underperforming board. One possible explanation for
this is defamation law. Because the ads name names, an overzealous
attack on a firm's directors might prompt a costly defamation suit.
Yet, truth is a defense to a libel suit and the circumspect
characterization of the Sears ad-which called the directors "Non-
Performing Assets'-made a successful suit unlikely.'
Monks himself offers a much more quotidian explanation: the
cost of the ad.'' A full page ad in the Wall Street Journal costs well over
$100,000.'.. "It is virtually impossible to be reimbursed for these
costs," Monks notes, "so small wonder that the mode is so little
employed."''
Given these obstacles, Monks and Minow save the shaming
17 This point can be extended to shaming generally. Shaming efforts will not
succeed unless the enforcer is credible and its values are shared by the enforcement
community. These factors limit the effectiveness of numerous shaming campaigns,
such as animal rights activism. On the other hand, a relatively credible enforcer can
sometimes use the threat of shaming to extract concessions from a target, such as a
corporation that has a valuable brand name at stake.
" Nevertheless, the possibility of a defamation suit may well discourage other
would-be shareholder enforcers from waging a shaming campaign, given the cost of
defending any subsequent litigation. For a discussion of defamation law as it applies to
publicity about corporate misdeeds and an argument that it is both too pro-plaintiff,
because of the enormous damage awards in successful cases, and too pro-defendant,
because it is so difficult to bring a successful suit, see FIssE & BRAmTHWArrE, supra note
48, at 255-57.
11 E-mail from Robert A.G. Monks, Chairman, Lens Investment Management, to
David A. Skeel, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Oct. 8,
2000, 06:36:55 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Monks E-mail].
Minow Interview, supra note 3.
)" Monks E-mail, supra note 149.
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strategy for cases in which there is a step that the firm obviously
should take, yet the outside directors remain passive. So far this has
occurred in two more instances: a challenge to Temple-Inland earlier
this year and an ad Monks and Minow got ready for Waste
Management but never ran.' 2  With Temple-Inland, the ad
proclaimed that "Banks Don't Grow on Trees" and offered "a botany
lesson for Temple-Inland Inc. directors" in support of a proposal to
separate the firm's unrelated banking and forest product businesses."'
The Waste Management ad revisited the Sears approach, including
silhouettes of the firm's twelve directors over the large black headline
"Long-Term Liabilities." 4
An obvious silver lining to the cost of a national advertisement is
that it limits this strategy to the most serious of shareholder activists-
those who are willing to put real money into the shaming effort. But,
it can also be seen as having too great a constraining effect. A
question we will want to consider in Part IV is whether the costs can be
reduced without inviting an excess of shaming.
C. ilegal Referrals and Other Sins: The Caremark Case
When shaming scholars speak of corporations and shaming in the
same breath, they invariably have in mind corporate price fixers,
polluters, or bribers. The principal enforcer is a public official rather
than a private actor-a judge who has the coercive force of the law at
her disposal.
In a very real sense, these offenders are subject to significant
shaming sanctions outside of the judicial process when they price fix,
152 Monks and Minow held off on the ad when Waste Management's board agreed
to make several changes in response to shareholders' concerns. Minow Interview,
supra note 3.
g The Temple-Inland ad is reprinted in Appendix I, infra p. 1867.
154 The Waste Management ad is reprinted in Appendix II, infra p. 1868. Another
successful use of the Sears shaming strategy came not from Monks and Minow
themselves, and not in the United States, but in an Italian newspaper article by
Chicago Business School Professor Luigi Zingales. See Luigi Zingales, Performance
consiglieri e caso Sirti [Performance, Directors, and the Sirti Case], CORRIERE DELLA SERA
(Milan), Jan. 3, 1999, at 16. In 1999, Zingales wrote a column describing Monks's
Sears ad and held the directors of the Italian firm Sirti up for similar disapproval for
failing to oust Sirti's scandalized CEO. Id. Zingales concluded the article by listing the
outside directors by name, and calling them Sirti's "non performing assets." Id. Less
than a year later, the CEO was gone and the Italian media attributed his dismissal to
Zingales's article. Dimissionatore via stampa: Zingales, il professore che ha silurato ii capo
della Sirti [Resignation by Press: Zingales, the Professor Who Ousted the Head of Sirti],
PANORAMA, Mar. 25, 1999, at 142.
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pollute, bribe, or otherwise misbehave. Just think of the recent
firestorm surrounding Firestone tires. Firestone faces serious legal
liability from the accidents that may have been caused by defective
tires."' These liabilities, however, pale in comparison to the costs of
the relentless-and relentlessly scathing-media coverage."5
For present purposes, the important question is whether these
reputational effects can be harnessed through formal shaming
sanctions. (A related question is whether the publicity in cases such as
the Firestone controversy will have a confounding effect on shaming.)
Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines took the lead on this
issue by authorizing shaming sanctions, 157 as we have seen, the strategy
is still very much in its infancy. The novelty is reflected in the
illustration we will explore below. While the case is very real, I will
speculate about the role that shaming penalties might play.
The firm in question is Caremark.'5' I use it both because it raises
all of the relevant shaming issues and because it prompted an
important disquisition on corporate compliance programs. Caremark
provides a variety of "alternative" services, including growth-hormone
treatment and HIX/AIDS-related treatments, at hospitals and
managed care facilities.'59  For years, Caremark entered into
consulting contracts with many of the same doctors who later referred
11S, ,'.., Kit R. Roane, Avoiding a Day in Court: Ford's Rush To Settle, U.S. NEWs &
WORLD REP., Jan. 22, 2001, at 45 ("As for Firestone, the suits alone could bankrupt the
company. ).
See,  .g., Stan Crock & Nicole St. Pierre, The Tire Flap: Behind the Feeding Frenzy,
BITs. WK., Oct. 16, 2000, at 126 (noting the deaths linked to Firestone tires and
describing the public reactions generated by those deaths); Mike France, The Litigation
Machine, Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 2001, at 114 (discussing the efforts by plaintiffs' attorneys
to file suit against Firestone); Milo Geyelin, Ford Will Ty To Settle All Pending Rollover
Suits, WAL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2001, at A3 (detailing Ford's desire to settle the Firestone-
related lawsuits quickly); Joan Muller et al., A Crisis of Confidence: CEO Nasser Scrambles
To Contain the Tire Problem, Bus. WIK., Sept. 18, 2000, at 40 ("For Ford .... the
mounting problems go well beyond the recall [of vehicles equipped with Firestone
tires]."); Nedra Pickler, Congress Toughens Car Safety Penalties, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 12,
2000, at Cl (reporting that, in the urake of the Firestone controversy, Congress passed
a bill that imposes jail terms on business executives who withhold information about
safety defects from government regulators).
L-7 S, supra note 47; see also Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An
U1pdate on Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247, 265-67
(1991) (describing the use of nonmonetary sanctions against corporations).
"" Caremark was originally part of a better kno,na firm, Baxter International, but
it u.as spun off in 1992. In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961
(Del. Ch. 1996).
V"" Id. at 961.
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patients to Caremark.'6 ° In 1991, the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") concluded that these practices may have
violated Medicare and Medicaid provisions that prohibit firms from
paying for referrals; in 1994, Caremark, several midlevel officers, and
a salesman were indicted.'6' Caremark subsequently settled the
allegations by pleading guilty to one count of mall fraud and paying a
criminal fine.'
62
In Caremark, like nearly all of the cases of this ilk (the foreign
bribery scandals involving GE and other firms in the 1970s are a good
example), there are three possible offenders: the corporation itself,
the (usually) midlevel managers who allegedly did the dirty deed, and
the higher-level managers who allegedly failed to detect or prevent
the misbehavior.
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the court, if it had
wished, could have subjected Caremark to a shaming sanction, such as
requiring a public apology.' 63 Inanimate though corporations may be,
they are far from immune from reputational penalties.'o Yet there is
also reason to suspect that a corporate apology often will have only a
limited effect. By the time a firm is convicted, its travails may already
have generated ongoing media attention and much of the
reputational penalty may already have been incurred. This does not
mean, of course, that we should ignore the option of shaming the
firm, but it does suggest that many of the most dramatic possibilities
for shaming will be those involving the individual offenders. "5
How about the midlevel officers who actually negotiated
Caremark's contracts, thus committing the sins in question? With
direct offenders who satisfy the relevant liability standard, courts could
use shaming as an alternative to incarceration or fines. In Caremark,
1 Id. at 961-62.
161 Id. at 962-64.
162 Id. at 965.
163 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(a) (1998) (authorizing
judges to "order [an organizational defendant], at its expense... to publicize the
nature of the offense committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of the punishment
imposed, and the steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar
offenses"); see also Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without... : Some Critical Reflections on the
Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397, 430 (1993) (noting the
"punitive publicity" scheme of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
64 See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 70 (measuring reputational effects).
165 Corporate-level shaming may prove most effective with firms that are locally,
but not nationally, prominent. In this instance, an ad in the principal local newspaper
may draw more attention to the firm's misbehavior than would otheise have been
the case.
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the fines were paid by the firm, not the individual officers."
Indemnification does not mean that the individual officers get off
scot-free, of course. They may be punished in a variety of indirect
ways, such as through diminished salary and reduced promotion
opportunities within the firm.1 67 Yet we cannot be certain that the
finn will indeed punish the officers. After all, their misbehavior-
paying for doctor referrals-actually helped Caremark's profits. The
firm's somewhat complicated incentives suggest that this may be a
particularly good context for shaming. The court could require that
Caremark issue a public apology, for instance, and explicitly name the
misbehaving officers. Unlike with fines, Caremark could not
insulate the midlevel officers from the effects of this sanction even if it
wanted to. Not only does shaming show clear disapproval, but it may
be especially valuable in contexts in which an offender's firm might
otherwise offer too great an umbrella of protection.
What about the higher-level officers and directors of Caremark?
The managers' misbehavior, if any, is more subtle, since they
participated only in an oversight role.6 A few criminal statutes
provide for individual liability for managers when the managers'
employees violate a criminal law.' In the absence of such liability,
the managers may still be sued for violating their fiduciary duties
under state corporate law. 7 ' Although the penalties are criminal in
the first case and civil in the second, the basis for holding individual
managers liable is similar in both contexts.
In Caremark itself, a group of shareholder plaintiffs filed a state law
derivative suit against Caremark's directors, based on the allegations
'" Caremark, 698 A.2d at 965-66.
Chapman, supra note 82, at 1698-99.
"' John Coffee has suggested a somewhat analogous method of shaming: courts
could use the presentencing report as a tool for shaming the firm and the responsible
employees. Coffee, supra note 67, at 429-31. As Coffee notes, this strategy would
require that presentencing reports be made public, which is not currently the case. Id.
at 431.
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
i" For a discussion of the most prominent cases finding criminal liability for
Stupervisory failures, see WniLI\ L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONs 640-43 (7th ed. 1995).
171 See, e.g., Miller v. AT&T Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that the
violation of a criminal statute through illegal political contributions "seems a
particularly appropriate basis for finding breach of the defendant directors' fiduciary
duty to the corporation. Under such circumstances, the directors cannot be insulated
from liability on the ground that the contribution wmas made in the exercise of sound
businessjudgment.").
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that surfaced in the HHS investigation and settlement.' Under prior
state (Delaware) law, managers had very little fiduciary duty exposure
for failing to supervise employees who violated a criminal or civil
law.'73 Chancellor Allen's opinion envisions a higher supervisory
standard for corporate directors.
Can it be said today[, as under the prior case law,] that, absent some
ground giving rise to suspicion of violation of law, that corporate
directors have no duty to assure that a corporate information gathering
and reporting systems [sic] exists which represents a good faith attempt
to... [assure compliance]? I certainly do not believe so.174
Quite to the contrary, Allen concludes, corporate directors' fiduciary
duties include the responsibility to implement an effective compliance
system.
75
How might shaming fit in here? A particularly nettlesome issue in
cases in which directorial misbehavior does not benefit the directors
directly is how to calibrate their liability. The difficulty is especially
acute when the directors' misbehavior may actually have provided
176benefits, at least until discovered, for the firm. In a case such as
Caremark, both problems are very much in evidence. The directors
did not benefit in any immediate way and the victims of any harm
were patients rather than the firm. If a court concluded that
Caremark's directors breached their fiduciary duties, the most obvious
damages measure would be the amount of referral fees paid. That
being said, any connection between this figure and either the
directors' personal benefit or any harm to Caremark would, of course,
be entirely accidental.
This is where shaming comes in. Although shaming is hardly an
exact science, shaming sanctions can be more easily tailored to the
nature of the directors' misbehavior-their failure to oversee-than
can an ordinary damages provision. Even if she does not impose
monetary liability, for instance, a judge can shame an offending
director by explicitly criticizing her in the published opinion for the
172 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 964.
173 The leading case on this point is Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d
125, 131 (Del. 1963).
174 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
175 Id. at 970.
176 This issue arose most prominently in the foreign bribery scandals of the late
1970s. For an attempt to develop a fiduciary duty and damages analysis for cases of this
sort, see Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law
Compliance Obligation in Section 2.01(a) of the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, 66
WASH. L. REV. 413 (1991).
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case.17 If you are curious as to how this might be done, take a look at
the Delaware takeover cases.178
I have painted a rosy picture of shaming thus far, so I should stop
for a moment to consider an important limitation on shaming in the
judicial context: timing. Litigation may not arise until years after the
behavior in question. If the offending firm can credibly claim that the
managers who committed the wrong have left or mended their ways
and that the offense does not reflect the firm in its current
incarnation, shaming may have little impact. Shaming is most
effective when it reveals information about how the firm and its
managers are likely to act in the future.
An additional limitation in the Delaware case law is the fact that,
far more than with actions brought by governmental officials, the
parties have an enormous incentive to settle fiduciary duty litigation
without insisting that the offending directors acknowledge their
responsibility, since the directors may lose their insurance protection
if they are found liable.7' Delaware's takeoverjurisprudence attests to
its ability to use moral suasion in opinions on prejudgment motions,'10
but Delaware has fewer opportunities to invoke posjudgment
sanctions, such as a formal, publicized apology.
To summarize, then, Caremark reveals both the promise and
07 A more difficult question, in many respects, is how to determine whether or
not the directors have in fact breached their oversight obligations. The difficulty of
making this determination is another reason to rely on moral suasion. Chancellor
Allen's Caremark opinion illustrates each of these impulses. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at
970 (suggesting that courts will find liability only in egregious cases).
1 See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 49 (Del.
1993) (criticizing Paramount's directors); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (criticizing Revlon's directors). Ed Rock
has written at length about the "sermonizing" quality of the Delaware takeover cases.
S'e, ,.g., Ed ard B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REv'. 1009, 1016 (1997) (referring to the role of courts as "preachers" to
corporations). I have described the same quality as the "moral dimension" of
Delaware decisionmaking. David A. Skeel,Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate
Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 163 (1997).
17, John Coffee has explored these incentives in several important articles. See,
,'.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theor ' for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 669, 676 (1986) (stating that problems of private enforcement stem from bad
incentives and organizational problems among professional plaintiffs' attorneys); see
almwJonathan R Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorneys Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REX'. 1, 22-27 (1991) (describing the economic incentives facing plaintiffs' attorneys in
class action and derivative litigation).
J- See, t.g., Paramount Communications, 637 A.2d at 34; Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 173.
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limitations of future shaming sanctions. A strategy in which the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are adjusted to further facilitate
corporate and individual shaming offers real promise, which I will
explore in more detail in the next Part. Delaware's recent interest in
imposing more meaningful compliance obligations in connection
with private directorial litigation may offer analogous advantages,
although this project is complicated by the traditional limitations of
courts' ability to police managers' oversight obligations.
D. From Publicity or Disclosure to Shaming: A Concluding Note
In each of the case studies we have considered, shaming and
publicity or disclosure have gone hand-in-hand. Absent publicity,
CalPERS's and Monks and Minow's shaming activities would have
little effect. The importance of publicity also holds true for most
judicial shaming efforts. To conclude, we should consider the link
between publicity, shaming, and points in between in slightly more
detail. Where does publicity, or the general disclosure of information,
leave off and shaming begin, and how does publicity differ from
shaming?
Recall that this Article has defined shaming as "'draw[ing]
attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an offender"' in order
to "'punish him for having those dispositions or engaging in those
actions." '181 Central to shaming, as I have defined it, is the posture of
the enforcer. Only if the enforcer intentionally and publicly singles
out the target, where the intent is to punish, has the enforcer engaged
in shaming. If the Wall Street Journal publishes a lengthy article
describing, for example, the dangerous risks posed by Firestone tires
and the actions of Firestone's managers, the authors have not shamed
Firestone and its executives. The purpose of the Wall Street Journals
news coverage is to provide information, not to cast explicit moral
opprobrium on the firms and managers whose travails the Journal
chronicles.' 8' Media coverage can be seen as a continuum from
description or publicity alone, to criticism with little or no moral
component, to shaming.'83
181 Supra text accompanying note 8 (quoting Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at
368).
182 When a newspaper article does take an explicitly judgmental stance, by
contrast, it may cross the line into the realm of shaming. Thus, a newspaper's "news"
pages generally do not shame, whereas its "op-ed" pages sometimes do.
183 An article or television commentary that questions the prospects of a firm or its
managers is an example of "criticism" that often lacks a moral component.
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To make sense of the relationship between shaming and publicity,
we must add two important clarifications. First, as noted above, even
if publication is not itself shaming, it may nevertheless figure
prominently in the shaming process. If my hypothetical Wall Street
Journal article reported on a shareholder or consumer activist's efforts
to shame Firestone or its managers, the article itself would not
constitute shaming. But the article, and others like it, might well be
the principal mechanism for communicating a shaming sanction.
The shareholder or consumer activist is the one doing the shaming,
but media coverage is essential to the effectiveness of the sanction.
Second, newspaper coverage that reveals unfavorable information
about a firm or its managers obviously can have a dramatic
reputational effect. True shaming, and in particular the act of
expressly casting judgment, seems to punish an offender more than
publicity or disclosure alone does under otherwise similar
circumstances. But this is small comfort to the managers of firms that
have been subject to widespread, ostensibly nonjudgmental, but
unflattering, newspaper coverage. Given that this coverage can, and
does, have shaming-like reputational effects, it offers many of the
same benefits and risks as shaming.
One interesting implication of the reputational effect of publicity
is that it suggests that lamakers can use disclosure obligations
preemptively, as an ex ante alternative to ex post shaming. "Sunlight
is... the best of disinfectants," as Louis Brandeis famously said, and
the securities laws that were enacted on this principle in 1933 and
1934 are widely viewed as having diminished fraud in the securities
markets. ' " Similarly, recent evidence suggests that firms tend to make
greater efforts to prevent environmental harm if they are required to
disclose their environmental practices." 5 In short, a firm that is
required to disclose misbehavior may not engage in it in the first
instance.
1 Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62
(Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper Torchbooks 1967) (1914).
1 : See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Prifonnance Benchmarkin g Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 296-98 (2001)
(explaining that man), "firms adopted ambitious improvement targets far above the
levels required for compliance with regulatory requirements"). For an analysis of
disclosure-based regulation in the health care context, see William M. Sage, Regulating
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Healthcare, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701
(1999).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Shaming is everywhere in corporate law. That much should be
clear by now. This Part briefly considers some of the implications of
our previous discussion, both for the legal regulation of shaming
sanctions and for our understanding of norms and shaming generally.
I start with shaming by shareholder activists and other private
enforcers, then turn to the use of shaming sanctions by judges.
A. Shaming by Shareholder Activists and Other Private Enforcers
With shaming by private enforcers, the most interesting insights of
the analysis are descriptive in nature. Not least of the discoveries is
the sheer prevalence of shaming activities. We have seen CalPERS use
its "focus list" to shame wayward firms, Monks and Minow compose
trenchant advertisements shaming offending directors by name, and
more. 86  This evidence of shaming in action has several useful
implications for our understanding of shaming in general.
One that I did not especially emphasize in the case studies, but
that should be evident nonetheless, is the role of legal rules and
governmental action in shaping social norms. A crucial moment in
the shift to more active involvement by institutional shareholders was
the Department of Labor's no-action letter to Avon in 1989. "" Prior
to this, institutional shareholders showed no inclination to throw their
weight around and corporate directors had little reason to pay much
attention to the complaints of dissatisfied shareholders. The rise of
the takeover market in the 1980s and managers' resistance to
takeovers increased the cost to shareholders of institutional investors'
willingness to side blindly with management. The Labor
Department's Avon letter seems to have forced institutional investors
to start taking these costs into account. These were the conditions
that made a shift in corporate governance norms, and effective
shaming, possible.
Another discovery is the prominent role of the media in corporate
shaming. Because the principal enforcement community-current
and would-be shareholders-is so far flung, it is quite costly to make
community members aware of the shaming effort. To reach a
national audience, Monks and Minow take out full page ads in the
Wall Street Journal, which quickly lifts the expense of a serious shaming
186 See supra Part III.
187 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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effort into the six figures. Both CalPERS and individual shareholder
activists take the likelihood of media attention, and thus free publicity,
into account when they decide which firms to target.' The pervasive
role of the financial press highlights the importance of a reputable
media to the effectiveness of corporate shaming. It also highlights an
important limitation of current shaming activities: they invariably
target large, prominent corporations and leave smaller, public
corporations largely unaffected.
Norms scholars, trying to explain how norms arise and change,
have emphasized the role of "norm entrepreneurs," who derive
particular benefits and are willing to incur significant costs in order to
help alter an existing norm."' We have seen vivid evidence of norm
entrepreneurs in our survey of private shaming. Robert Monks is a
"traitor to his class," a former bank president who embarked on a
crusade to reform corporate governance in the 1980s.' Although he
and Nell Minow hoped to profit from their governance adventures,
profits have been only a secondary motive.'9' Each new venture, from
Institutional Shareholder Services to The Corporate Library, has been
funded by Monks's own private fortune. 'q The combination of
credibility-both Monks and Minow are comfortable in and familiar
with the elite world of corporate directors-and missionary zeal has
enabled them to play an important role in the shift in governance
norms.
The shaming effort is buttressed by the fact that corporate
directors are the "most reputationally sensitive people in the world."'93
The boards of prominent corporations are places where reputations
matter, which makes them particularly fertile ground for shaming
when the directors have violated a norm. This does not mean that a
director's reputation will be destroyed if she is shamed, as simple
A" -s an illustration of an unintended use of this principle, Minow cites her and
MN nks's campaign against the directors of the Mirror, a prominent London newspaper.
.., Minow Interview, supra note 3. She attributes the success of the battle in no small
part to the eagerness of other British newspapers to publish criticism of the directors
ofarixal. Id.
S ' supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
ROSENBERG, supra note 145.
Minow Interview, supra note 3.
"We are our ownm venture capitalist, or Bob's our own venture capitalist,"
according to Minow. Id. As with more traditional venture capitalist arrangements, the
ultimate goal is to profit from the activism. Id.
111 /d.
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signaling theories of shaming sometimes suggest. IM In fact, corporate
shaming offers obvious avenues for quickly restoring a director's
reputation, such as subsequently responding to the enforcers'
demands (think of the Sears battle). Even recalcitrant directors do
not suddenly lose all stature. Shaming sanctions are unusually
effective, however, because a director's reputation is her single most
important asset.
If shaming is effective, at least in some contexts, an obvious
question is whether the existing regulatory framework could be
adjusted to expand its reach. As we have seen, the biggest obstacle to
current shaming efforts is the cost.'95 The best way to encourage
private shaming would be to reduce the expense. The SEC has
already taken a few steps in this direction. In 1992, the SEC reformed
the proxy requirements promulgated under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to give shareholders greater flexibility to criticize firms
and their directors outside of the formal proxy solicitation process.
The 1992 reforms make it possible to publish a newspaper ad
criticizing a firm's directors without engaging in a full-blown proxy
campaign, for example. But a shareholder enforcer still faces
significant costs if she wishes to shame an underperforming board of
directors. What else might the SEC do to encourage private shaming
sanctions?
The most obvious way to further reduce costs would be to
subsidize shaming directly. The SEC, or the lawmakers who regulate
state corporate law, could spread the cost of shaming over all of the
firm's shareholders by requiring the firm to pay for a shareholder
enforcer's expenses. If the firm subsidized the cost of an ad in the
194 Kahan and Posner, for instance, suggest that "shaming typically destroys [a
person's reputation]." Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at 370. For a similar criticism,
see Scott, supra note 37, at 1611 (arguing that reputation does not simply reflect a
binary division between those who are "good types" and those who are "bad types").
'5 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Prior to 1992, a shareholder who made a statement or purchased an ad
criticizing the firm's directors might be deemed to have engaged in a proxy
solicitation, even if the shareholder had no intention of soliciting votes from other
shareholders. As a result, the shareholder would be forced to incur the time and
expense of filing formal proxy materials with the SEC, as required by Rule 14a-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1999) (requiring filing with the SEC prior to conducting a
solicitation). The 1992 reforms amended Rule 14a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b), to
exempt shareholders from this requirement so long as they seek only to benefit from
their activities on the same pro rata basis as other shareholders. 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-
2(b) (1) (ix). For a succinct overview of the 1992 reforms, see Stephen Choi, Pro, Issue
Proosals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Pro.y Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233, 235-37
(2000).
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11al Street Journal or a limited proxy campaign, we can be sure that
shaming strategies would become much more widespread. The
obvious problem is that subsidizing shaming could make it too
widespread. If shareholders could engage in shaming tactics at no
cost, every shareholder with a bit of time on her hands might engage
in shaming campaigns even in the absence of any serious evidence of
corporate misbehavior."" One benefit of the current framework,
which forces shareholder enforcers to bear their own costs, is that it
gives the enforcers a powerful incentive to employ shaming
techniques only where the corporate offenders' behavior is genuinely
shaneworthy. This does not mean that the current approach is ideal,
however, since it denies costs even to the most desirable of shaming
efforts. In the closely related, indeed, overlapping, context of proxy
contests, several commentators have argued for a rule that would
reimburse shareholder activists whose proposals received a substantial
percentage-for example, thirty-five or forty percent-of other
shareholders' votes. " So long as the costs of shaming were treated as
reimbursable, such a rule would subsidize the efforts of shareholder
activists who used the proxy process and whose campaign drew
substantial shareholder support!
I have focused throughout the Article on shaming by large
shareholder activists who use the proxy process, together with
shaming by the financial press. If this is shaming at the "wholesale"
level, it is also important to recognize the prospect of shaming at the
lower, retail level as well. The internet has sharply reduced the cost of
communicating with other investors, as we have seen with the recent
use of the internet for grassroots shareholder activism. °0  This
P-7 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & ECON. 395, 422 (1983) (describing the inverse relationship between the costs of
a proxy fight and the incentive to wage one).I" See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Legal Policy
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1071, 1085 (1990) ("Tying compensation to
'success' influences proxy contests by benefiting the contestants likely to receive
sufficient votes to make them 'successful.'").
A more complete reform of the proxy process would also consider the
possibility that, in other respects, the proxy rules may provide too much of a subsidy to
shareholder proponents. Under Rule 14a-8, 17 C.FR. § 240.14a-8 (1999), the firm is
required to include a wide variety of proposals in its own proxy materials. For an
extensive review of current shareholder activism and several proposals for limiting a
firm's responsibility for bearing the cost of including shareholder proposals, see
Romano, supra note 105.
1- See, e.g., Sara Steindorf, A Place at the Table, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Nov. 20,
2000 (describing activism at United Companies Financial). Similar efforts have sprung
up elsewhere. Thomas Friedman has argued that activists should "compel companies
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development has intriguing implications for shareholder suffirage, but
it also raises the risk of indiscriminate shaming. To give just a single,
hypothetical example, one can easily imagine efforts to manipulate
stock prices by disclosing damaging information about a manager
that has serious consequences for the manager but little long-term
significance for the firm. The SEC can police some of this behavior
under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, but the
Commission faces a variety of enforcement obstacles-not least of
which is its limited enforcement budget.'O1 One obvious moral is that,
as the cost of shaming decreases, the downside risks of shaming
sanctions may increasingly come to the fore.
B. Shaming by Judicial or Governmental Enforcers
1. Expanding the Role of Shaming Sanctions
As we have seen, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines already
contemplate the use of shaming sanctions against corporate offenders
and several scholars have called for still broader use of shaming.2 , My
analysis has echoed these conclusions, and suggested a more nuanced
approach to the shaming of corporate and individual offenders..2 1' For
corporate criminal liability, the most effective liability scheme would
include a fixed, strict liability component together with a higher,
second-stage penalty for firms that failed to adequately monitor their
employees. Shaming sanctions would come into play at the second
stage rather than the first, as an alternative or supplemental penalty
for firms that violated their compliance obligations.04
As we saw earlier, shaming can be a useful alternative sanction
against an offending firm and is an even more powerful sanction for
individual offenders. 20 5 A firm that has been charged with polluting or
to behave better by mobilizing global consumers through the Internet." THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLrVE TREE 207 (Anchor Books 2000) (1999). As an
example, he cites the Fair Labor Association, which "issues annual reports on each
[global apparel] company's compliance" with "a minimum standard for working
conditions in their factories." Id. at 208.
201 An additional complication is the often hazy line between market manipulation
and ethically questionable, but legally permissible, uses of the internet. For an
example, see Michael Lewis, Jonathan Lebed's Extracurricular Activities, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
25, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
202 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
204 Seesupra text accompanying note 73.
205 See supra notes 78-82, 165-68 and accompanying text.
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violating antitrust laws can limit the effect of a criminal fine on the
midlevel employees who actually did the polluting or price-fixing, or
the managers who oversaw them, by indemniffing the individual
offenders. Negotiating a settlement that calls for the firm, but not the
individuals, to pay a fine obviously has the same effect. By contrast,
the firm cannot easily take the sting out of a shaming penalty.
The general implications for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
are thus two-fold: first, the guidelines could facilitate shaming by
authorizing the shaming at the second stage of a two-stage liability
framework for corporate offenders; °6 second, the guidelines should
also permit courts to shame individual offenders.
One concern with inviting courts to step up their use of shaming
sanctions is that courts might use them inconsistently. That is, we
might encounter the same kinds of disparities in shaming practices
that commentators criticized in sentencing generally and that led to
the Guidelines in the first instance. "7 As with sentencing generally, an
obvious solution is to standardize the shaming options.2" Let me
suggest a simple framework that would provide a series of
standardized options for any given case. The obvious starting point
might be a standardized text that courts could impose as part of the
higher, second-level sanction imposed on firms that fail to adequately
monitor their employeesY.2 " The sanction could also be standardized
in other ways, such as the size or cost of the advertisement used.
Even when courts did not explicitly shame individual offenders-
because they acted with negligence rather than scienter, for instance,
or because it was unclear who was responsible-they could require
that the finn's CEO or other prominent officers appear in court for
As noted earlier, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines already permit the
shaming element of this approach. See supra note 163 and accompan)ing text
(discussing the imposition of a forced apology by the court).
,,7 See Massaro, supra note 7, at 1940-42. Massaro worries that criminal shaming
sanctions often seem to arise from "episodic, almost whimsical bursts of judicial,
legislative, or prosecutorial inspiration." Id. at 1940.
;"" Kahan and Posner emphasize the importance of standardizing the shaming
sanction in their proposal for shaming white-collar criminals. See Kahan & Posner,
supa note 6, at 385-87; see also FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 48, at 311 ("[I]t is
possible to quantify formal publicity orders in terms of media time or space, and
cost.").
" Kahan and Posner quote, as an example, a court-ordered advertisement by
General Wood Preserving Company announcing that the firm "recently pled guilty in
federal court to illegally disposing of hazardous waste .... We are sony for what we
did, and we hope that our experience will be a lesson to others that environmental
laws must be respected." Kahan & Posner, supra note 6, at 385.
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the sentencing in significant cases, both to give a face to the
misbehavior and to implicitly shame the officers 10 For cases in which
explicit shaming is appropriate, the standardized sanction could be
adjusted to include individual offenders. The simplest way to target
individual offenders directly would be to include them in the
sanction. The court-ordered advertisement could state that a
particular midlevel officer was found liable for illegally disposing of
hazardous waste, for instance, or name the directors who failed to
establish an adequate compliance program.
As with shaming by shareholder activists, the presence or absence
of publicity complicates the efficacy of the sanction. If the firm's
misbehavior is widely publicized, shaming may add little to the
reputational penalty the firm has already incurred. With lower profile
firms, on the other hand, neither the misbehavior nor the court-
ordered advertisement may create much of a media stir. In both
contexts, however, formal shaming sanctions can play a valuable role.
Shaming may add details omitted from the coverage of widely
reported scandals, for instance, and it may draw attention to
misbehavior that would otherwise receive no publicity at all.2"
Another concern is the risk that the routine use of shaming
sanctions would diminish their effectiveness. As Toni Massaro noted
in the context of criminal shaming, "if the penalty were to become a
common sanction, it may produce a shaming overload, which could
reduce public interest in these displays and thereby lessen the
deterrence impact."2 1 2  The risk of shaming overload seems less
pronounced in the corporate law context than with crimes such as
drunk driving, but it underscores the importance of limiting judicial
shaming sanctions to serious misbehavior.
As evidenced by the Caremark case itself, private litigation
sometimes serves as an alternative, parallel device for holding the
firm's directors accountable for their oversight responsibilities.1
Because of the awkward fit between many corporate misbehavior cases
and the traditional concerns of corporate law, and because Delaware
210 Jayne Barnard makes this proposal in a recent article and argues that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be adjusted to permit broader use of this
approach. See Barnard, supra note 48.
21 See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 48, at 299 (noting that media coverage
often omits the names of particular firms when more than one firm is involved in a
scandal and it often neglects to point out that criminal offenses are involved).
2 Massaro, supra note 7, at 1930.
213 See supra Part III.C.
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judges have only limited control over settlements by the parties, I am
somewhat less optimistic about the effectiveness of judicial
enforcement in this context. Yet Delaware's judges are the moral
arbiters of U.S. corporate law, and even settled cases generally offer an
opportunity to shame firms and directors who have failed to provide
adequate oversight.
2. Limiting the Liability of Individual Offenders by Contract
A final issue is whether firms should be permitted to limit the
liability of individual offenders. Some commentators have argued that
individual employees should not be held liable for polluting and
other corporate torts because the prospect of liability may cause
employees to take excessive precautions and the firm is in a better
position than a court to determine whether and how an individual
offender should be punished.14 In Caremark, Chancellor Allen raised
the very similar issue of whether firms should be permitted to adopt a
charter provision that waives liability for directors who fail to
adequately monitor the firm's compliance with antitrust or
environmental laws.215
The problem with limiting liability in each of these contexts is that
firms' incentives are less trustworthy than might initially seem to be
the case. Because the firm's liability is limited by the value of it assets,
it will not internalize the effects of liability that could exceed the
firm's total value. Assuring that individual offenders are also on the
hook if they commit a corporate tort is an important means of making
sure that the costs of violations are fully internalized." 6 "
Permitting firms to waive directors' liability for compliance raises
an analogous and equally intriguing externality problem. Delaware
adopted a provision inviting firms to waive their directors' due care
liability in 1986, in order to address concerns that the prospect of
liability would have a chilling effect on directors' willingness to serve
on boards."" In most contexts, market forces already pressure
z4 Bruce Chapman takes this position, although he would permit individual
liability for individual offenders who benefited from their misbehavior. See Chapman,
supra note 82.
2' Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 n.27.
See Coffee, supra note 67, at 389-90.
"17 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (Supp. 2000). Delaware adopted section
102(b) (7) in order to overrule the Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkwn, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), which held the directors of Trans Union liable for
violating their duty of care.
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directors to perform well and penalize firms whose directors are
ineffective, so eliminating liability will often have little or no adverse
effect. But the market is less dependable with pollution or antitrust
violations because these violations can actually benefit shareholders
monetarily if the firm's expected sanction is less than its profits from
the misbehavior.2 '8 As a result, firms might have too great an incentive
to waive directors' compliance liability.
Although the debate on these issues has focused on liability in
general, rather than shaming in particular, it has obvious implications
for shaming. Eliminating the liability of individual offenders in each
of these contexts would also limit judicial enforcers' ability to invoke
shaming sanctions. In both contexts, it makes more sense to preclude
firms from limiting liability by contract.
CONCLUSION
I do not want to overstate the virtues of shaming sanctions in
corporate law. As we have seen, shaming by shareholder activists is
based on simple yardsticks, such as the number of independent
directors, and it is not entirely clear how useful these yardsticks are.
With judicial enforcers, shaming sanctions sometimes do not add
much to more traditional approaches to liability. Within these
parameters, however, shaming can play a valuable role. Shareholder
activists are convinced that shaming dramatically increases the
effectiveness of their reform efforts. Shaming can fill in the gaps of
civil and criminal liability, ensuring that individual and corporate
offenders are fully punished for their misbehavior. This Article has
attempted to highlight the existing uses of shaming in corporate law,
pointing out both the risks of shaming and the places where there is
room for more.
218 For a useful analysis of the reasons why fines often do not cause firms to fully
internalize the costs of their misbehavior, see Coffee, supra note 67, at 389-93.
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APPENDIX I
A BOTANY LESSON FORTEMPLE-INLAND INC. DIRECTORS
BANKS DON'T GROW ON TREES
TO TEMPLE-INLAND SHAREHOLDERS:
You know banks don't grow on trees. Now, let the board or
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Stockholder Proposal #3 on) our proxy.
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APPENDIX II
The Directors of WMX Technologies, Inc.
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